

War on Terror and Its Socio-Economic and Political Implications on Khyber Pakhtunkhwa



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Abstract: *The war on terror became a significant national issue for Pakistan following the 9/11(2001) incident. Pakistan had never experienced a conflict that was as violent and difficult for the country's state, society, and institutional system. The war had compromised the country's security at home and abroad. According to the United States, non-state actors purportedly held the Taliban administration and the Afghan Al Qaeda network accountable. Pakistan was most important since it offered access bully land, air, and sea in addition to logistical and intelligence help. General Pervaiz Musharraf's choice to make Pakistan a front- line state in the US-sponsored War on Terror (WOT) is the most contentious move in Pakistan's political history. Musharraf offered the US unreserved cooperation, and the nation joined the War on Terror, which eventually prompted the establishment of a counterterrorism policy by the government on a global as well as local, regional, and national level. The country had to deal with the Socio-Economic, political, and strategic effects and shortco6as a result of which it was vulnerable to the influence and pressure of wealthier countries. Pakistan paid a high price for its involvement in the War on Terror (WOT) as the country experienced a string of suicide attacks, nearly 500 IED explosion, and bombings in the country's major cities, particularly in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP) and Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA).*

Keywords: War on Terror, US, Pakistan, Kp, Socio-economic, National Security

Introduction

There is no single, accepted definition for the complicated phenomenon known as terrorism. This is so that they can all define it according to their view. A terrorist attack is what the international database of terrorism describes as "the threatened or actual use of illegal force and violence by a non-state actor to achieve a political, economic, religious, or social goal through fear, coercion, or intimidation". The Twin Towers were attacked in 2001 (September 11), which showed that terrorism has advanced to a new stage on a worldwide scale. After the horrific events of 9/11, US-Pakistan relations were drastically changed, and in 2004 Pakistan

were considered a "major non-NATO ally," and Pakistan is once more considered to be a front-line state. In this situation, the US government approached Pakistan and presented stark alternatives, bringing the two countries closer together through shared interests. Additionally, during that time, the tensions and conflicts between the two states were more intense. In exchange for US assistance to support Pakistan's development in the social and economic spheres, Pakistan was anticipated to contribute to the battle against terrorism. (Kronstadt, 2009).

Although there have been countless instances of tension in the relationship, nothing major has happened. The 9/11 events served as the catalyst

for the re-engagement effort. By sending top political and military people to Pakistan, the US overcame its misgivings about the Musharraf regime and took the first step towards a fruitful partnership. In addition to increasing aid, the US relaxed sanctions against Pakistan (Susan, 2012). While the main goals of this aid and support were to help Pakistan improve the capabilities of its security forces and the protection of its borders, it was also focused on promoting democracy, human rights, food security, and the eradication of narcotics. The shipment of weaponry and military hardware to Pakistan is the result of the two nations' security cooperation (Kronstadt, 2012). According to experts, between 2002 and 2009, the United States provided Pakistan with aid and reimbursements totaling \$15.3 billion (Kronstadt, 2009).

Methodology

Qualitative and analytical research is the foundation of this paper. When looking for information about a particular subject, empirical methods are necessary. Statistics and data analysis rely heavily on both methods. As a result, data are categorized, described, compared, and measured in qualitative research. Analytical research, on the other hand, focuses on the events' causes and effects. As a result, research is an art form of scientific inquiry. It aims to gather more data. In fact, without analytical and descriptive methods, modern research is difficult to complete. As a result, research is qualitative and descriptive in the sense that facts must be recounted using information from primary and secondary sources. In this research, the semi-structured interview method is used to collect information from different scholars, writers, politicians, diplomats, academicians, bureaucrats, and journalists. This method is used as the key research instrument to collect field data. In the same way, focus group discussions have been conducted to gain a deeper insight into the subject of inquiry. Furthermore, the analysis of the findings of this research provides clear guidelines for future research to explore areas that are crucial for conceptual clarity that is helpful to develop a more optimistic stand and

inform the concerned quarter about the sensitivity of people and the implications of terrorism on the region.

Since the announcement of the War-on-Terror, the precise relationship between warfare and terrorism has become complicated because it is linked with extremism and radicalization from an ontological, non-state-centric perspective. As a result, the current study will employ Clausewitz's non-state-centric frameworks to uncover and highlight state-initiated harm. However, this paper also examines Bruce Hoffman's definition of terrorism as a highly problematic warfare because it is an ideology of fear and repression. They claimed that terrorism breeds enemies and promotes violence rather than reducing terror and strengthening security.

Aims of the Study

1. To assess the socio-economic and political implications of the War on Terrorism in Pakistan.

Study Questions

1. What are the socio-economic and political impacts of the War on Terrorism on Pakistan's state and society?

Review of the Existing Literature

Political stability and economic growth have been demonstrated in empirical research to be negatively impacted by terrorism (Virgo, 2001, Hess, 2004, Tavares, 2004, Crain, 2006, Naor, 2006, Verdier, 2008, Hess, 2011). Gaibullov & Sandler (2009) demonstrate how international terrorist attacks significantly impede economic expansion. Terrorism has harmed Asian stock markets, assert Rafique, Aslam, Kang, Salman, and Mohti (2018). McCarthy, Barth, Yago, Phumiwasana, and Li (2006) contend that resource allocation can be negatively impacted by terrorism, which will hinder capital formation and output growth.

Political stability and economic growth have been demonstrated in empirical research to be negatively impacted by terrorism (Virgo, 2001, Tavares, 2004, Orphanides, 2004, Crain, 2006, Naor, 2006, Verdier, 2008, Blomberg, Hess,

2011, Sandler, 2009) show how international terrorist strikes substantially restrict financial expansion. Asian stock markets have suffered as a result of terrorism, claimed (Mohti, 2018). According to (McCarthy, 2006), terrorism may result in the inefficient use of resources, which will stunt the growth of both capital formation and output.

Terrorism has hurt Pakistan's economic advancement, according to scholarly analyses of the direct effects of terrorism on economic growth, there is some empirical research available in Pakistan. (Hyder, 2015, Khan, 2016, Yousaf, 2017, Shahbaz, 2013, Shafi, 2018) assert that counterterrorism operations have short term as well as long term effects on Pakistan's fiscal progress. Research on the indirect consequences of terrorism on economic growth has not yet been conducted in Pakistan. This gap will be attempted to be filled by the current study. The study's goal is to examine both the immediate and long-term impacts of terrorism on Pakistan's economic progress. Once certain channel variables are fixed, a macro econometric model is built using traditional econometric techniques to evaluate the indirect consequences of terrorism on economic expansion.

The total expenditures associated with terrorism have hurt the economy of Pakistan by nearly 126.79 billion dollars (10762.14 billion rupees). Additionally, the cost of conducting business has gone up due to the disruption of routine economic and trading activity. Foreign trade with Pakistan has also been harmed by terrorism. As a result, Pakistan's share in the market was damaged, and its growth rates are less rapid than anticipated. Terrorist incidents in Pakistan during the fiscal years 2014–15 and 2015–16 resulted in financial losses. Without a doubt, terrorism had a negative impact on exports, tax receipts, and foreign investment. In addition to the economic and financial damages, Pakistan has also experienced losses in human beings. Between 2003 and 2016, terrorist incidents in Pakistan resulted in the deaths of 6,660 security personnel and 21,485 innocent civilians.

The literature has found a number of channel variables that can be used to predict how

terrorism would impact economic activities (Tsiddon, 2004, Stutzer, 2007, Verdier, 2008, Enders, 2008, Khan, 2016). Taking the internal savings, rate of currency exchange, tourism, infrastructure, national capital creation, capital flight, brain drain, government spending, and debt burden as examples, terrorism hinders economic progress. It also causes inflation to rise. We use three channel variables: foreign direct investment (FDI), domestic investment, and government expenditure to analyze the hidden impacts of terrorism on output growth. We selected these channel features since FDI has dramatically declined in Pakistan as a result of terrorism and travel restrictions placed on its enterprises by Western nations (Khan, 2016). Inflows of FDI (net) decreased from 3.66 % of GDP in 2005 to 0.36% of GDP in the year 2015. Terrorism has indeed severely damaged the acquiring of capital, the primary source of production. Wealth creation represented 17.46 percent of GDP in 2005, and in 2015, it had fallen to 13.51 percent of GDP. Since it reduced domestic output, it has slowed down economic progress. Furthermore, from 7.84% of GDP in 2005 to 11.84% of GDP in 2015, government spending on counterterrorism has surged. Thus, these three economic sectors have suffered greatly from terrorism, which has slowed economic growth. Terrorism also causes significant harm to local infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and telephone lines.

According to and (yopadhyay, 2014), it discourages FDI by making doing business more expensive, and all types of terrorism deter FDI. According (Stanisic, 2016), FDI is more vulnerable to terrorism than foreign debt and portfolio investments, and FDI is also negatively impacted by terrorism. As a result, foreign investment rises along with the level of terrorism in the host nation.

Because it makes it possible for international investors to diversify their investment portfolios, terrorism discourages foreign investment (Mody, 2005, Lee, 2007, Agrawal, 2011). Terrorism lowers total investment by the foreigners (Gardeazabal, 2008). According to (Gardeazabal, 2003), terrorism has severely damaged the financial markets, which in turn

impacts foreign business involvement. Terrorism raises the cost of business operations because expensive security arrangements and compensation reduce FDI profits. FDI (Foreign direct investment) is hampered by all kinds of terrorism (Younas, 2014). According to Shahzad, foreign direct investment in Pakistan is negatively impacted by terrorism. The effects of terrorism harm both local and foreign investment (Orphanides, 2004, Tsiddon, 2004, Persitz, 2007, Sandler, 2008, Tavares, 2011, Sandler, 2009) claim that terrorism has slowed economic growth since it costs more for the government to establish effective security measures

Incidents of September 11 (2001) and Religious Proliferation in Pakistan

This chapter examines the complex nature of historical Pakistani terrorism. It is divided into two main sections, the first of which looks at what made Pakistan the west's "potential base of Islamic Radicalism." It also makes an effort in order to explain how these extreme networks function, how they have evolved over time, and how they are organized. Investigative work has been done to determine how the state and outside forces influenced the growth of these organizations and how the state might use them to implement its security agenda. The second part of the essay covers General Musharraf's viewpoint on the political unrest and terrorist activity that existed in Pakistan before to 9/11. The regime's security concerns and policies toward Afghanistan and India are examined in the context of terrorism being viewed as a "homegrown affair" fostered by elements of Pakistani society, appeasement strategies used by the government, and external influences.

2.2 Incident of 9/11 (2001)

In the 1980s, countries like Libya, Iran, and Iraq were accused of supporting terrorism. As it was claimed that these countries trained terrorists on their soil and provided them with safe havens, weapons, and training in guerrilla warfare all over the world. Throughout the 1990s, the US began to express grave concerns about terrorist attacks targeting US citizens (Jha, 1976). The US had become blind to the dangers of nurturing

Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan due to its obsession with driving out the Soviets, and it had neglected to take into account the long-term implications on the area in general and the US in particular. In the years that followed, a serious scenario resulted from the arming and training of militants, as well as from the growing tolerance for the expansion of the drug trade. The US ignored the aforementioned critical difficulties since their primary objective was to destroy the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which they supported,

Al-Qaeda's principal goal after the first Gulf War was to prevent the US from taking control of the Middle East. Under the guise of preserving Middle Eastern stability, Saudi Arabia encouraged the US to remove its troops. Al-Qaeda fought valiantly when US troops were stationed on Saudi territory, which it considered to be the holiest of places. Due to their inability to defend their territory from foreign troops, Al-Qaeda severely denounced the Saudi government's conduct and branded them as phony Muslims (Aftab, 2013). The primary goal of this Al-Qaeda-led effort was to topple the Saudi royal family and establish an Islamic regime akin to Al-Qaeda's on the Arabian Peninsula. In reaction to bin Laden's anti-state actions, the Saudi authorities exiled him in 1992 and revoked his citizenship in 1994. Al-Qaeda became widely known on a global scale. As part of its violent and relentless assault against the US, it not only continued its war against the west but also primarily enlisted a number of militant fundamentalist groups that shared some of its ideological viewpoints. Osama bin Laden emerged as the Taliban's principal supporter and leader. Al-Qaeda was a well-known and well-organized insurgent organization in Afghanistan. They earned the respect of the ruling Taliban regime and received special treatment in Afghanistan ((Ahmad, 2010; Clarke, 2004).

Osama bin Laden, the group's leader, developed a solid reputation for battling the Soviets, despite the fact that the CIA actively intervened in Afghanistan throughout the Soviet occupation. Osama gained support from the US in his battle with the Soviet Union. He immediately rose to

fame in Afghanistan as a result of his involvement in the 'Afghan Jihad' against the Red Army, and the Taliban government greeted him as an honored visitor. In this area, hosts' lives are put at risk in order to treat guests with the utmost respect and provide them with constant protection. The international community typically views terrorism as a morally repugnant and illegal crime against humanity. Randomly harming more people is an attack on the social and moral fabric of society the general knowledge of crime and the tragedy committed both domestically and abroad. This poses a greater security risk to both governments and non-profit organizations, therefore they must develop plans and effective regulations to deal with it. The law explicitly distinguishes between combatants and non-combatants, and it is written to offer non-combatants protection in accordance with *jus in bello* principles, specifically. Killing innocent civilians on purpose is illegal, and doing so as part of a military or political strategy is never ethically justified or acceptable. (Chou, 2003; (Clapham, 2004)

War on Terrorism and General Musharraf Efforts for Prevention

In the 1980s, countries like Libya, Iran, and Iraq were accused of supporting terrorism. As it was claimed that these countries trained terrorists on their soil and provided them with safe havens, weapons, and training in guerrilla warfare all over the world. Throughout the 1990s the United States was extremely concerned about terrorist attacks on its citizens. The US had become blind to the dangers of nurturing Islamic fundamentalism in Afghanistan due to its obsession with driving out the Soviets, and it had neglected to take into account the long term implications on the area in general and the US in particular. In the years that followed, a serious scenario resulted from the arming and training of militants, as well as from the growing tolerance for the expansion of the drug trade. The US ignored the aforementioned critical difficulties since their primary objective was to destroy the Soviet Union in Afghanistan, which they supported.

After the first Gulf War, Al-Qaeda's main

objective was to stop the US from establishing hegemony in the Middle East. Saudi Arabia urged that the US withdraw its troops under the pretence of maintaining stability in the Middle East. When United States forces were based in Saudi Arabia, which the organization considered as the holiest place on earth, Al-Qaeda put up a valiant battle (Cohen,2006). Al-Qaeda fiercely criticized the Saudi government's policies, and Bin Laden dubbed the Saudi royal family "fake Muslims" for their unwillingness to protect their nation against invaders. The main goal of this Al-Qaeda-led Islamic regime on the Arabian Peninsula. In response to bin Laden's anti-state activities, the Saudi authorities expelled him in 1992 and revoked his citizenship in 1994.

Al-Qaeda rose to prominence on the global stage. It not only continued its battle against the west but also mainly enlisted a number of militant fundamentalists groups that shared some of its ideological ideas as part of its violent and aggressive assault against the US. Osama bin Laden emerged as the main backer and commander of the Taliban. In Afghanistan, Al-Qaeda was a well-known and Organized militant group. They developed close ties with the rolling Taliban leadership and were given special treatment in Afghanistan. While the CIA actively supported the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden, the organization's leader, established a solid reputation for fighting the Soviets. When fighting the Soviets, Osama received assistance from the US. As a result of his participation in the so-called Afghan Jihad against Moscow adventurism and subsequent status as a distinguished guest of the Taliban government, he quickly gained legendary status in Afghanistan. Guests are always treated with utmost respect in both Afghan and Arabian culture, and they are always granted safety at the price of their hosts' lives. (Sunawar,2016).

During this time, terrorism also began to emerge; it was described as the deliberate use of terror to achieve political objectives. Examples of such acts include the kidnapping of government employees, famous people, and innocent bystanders; the assassination of political figures; the bombing of embassies; and

the hijacking of aero planes. A completely new kind of warfare in terms of technology, victimization, threats, and retaliation has been brought forth by modern terrorism. A group with a terror agenda would always opt to use widespread terror techniques against the people in order to accomplish its aims due to the serious consequences. If it is not curbed and restrained, terrorism may reappear after a certain time and drive individuals into the ranks of revolutionaries. The international community typically views terrorism as a morally repugnant and illegal crime against humanity. The social and moral foundation of society is attacked when more people are harmed randomly. The general knowledge of crime and the tragedy committed both democratically and abroad. Governments and non-governmental organizations are more at risk for security as a result, so strategies and practical laws to counter it must be developed. In accordance with the principles of *jus in bello*, the law specially offers immunity to non-combatants and makes a clear distinction between combatants and non-combatants. Killing innocent civilians on purpose is illegal, and doing so as part of a military or political strategy is never ethically justified or acceptable. The primary definition of terrorism is the deliberate killing to achieve political objectives. (Buzab,1983).

Terrorism is currently the biggest threat facing the US government. The US congress and previous administration have occasionally found it helpful to base their policy decisions on the quantity and pattern of terrorist acts that have occurred in the past. Due to the use of sophisticated modern computers and communication devices by terrorists, more information is being obtained in this area. For instance, it is more likely than ever that a Terries strike on a hideout may lead to the seizure of their laps and crucial data. Early in the 1990s, neither the senior Bush Administration nor the Clinton Administration ranked terrorism as their top concern or agenda item in terms of national security during president Clinton's presidency. In the latter half of the 20th century, numerous groups employed terrorism as a means of influencing policies in Europe, the Middle East,

and Asia. The rise of international terrorism was responsible for incidents of kidnapping, hijacking, and bombing of aircraft as well as destruction of infrastructure and armed attacks on public and government buildings. (Buzan,1998).

Socio-Economic and Political Implications War on Terror

The repercussions of terrorism on the economy are both immediate and long-term. Human losses, "collateral damage" to businesses, infrastructure, and standing crops, as well as a decline in economic activity, are all examples of direct costs. The high cost of providing assistance and rehabilitation to displaced individuals is one of the indirect costs, along with loss of investment, impossibility of continuing development efforts, lost production time, rise in unemployment, and drop in productivity. Both direct and indirect expenses are rapidly increasing as a result of the conflict's escalation and the increase in terrorist attacks in Pakistan's tribal region. The Economic Survey claims that Pakistan has allegedly suffered the most from the war on terrorism. When it comes to the momentum of expansion, Pakistan's economy has fallen behind since 2007. Pakistan spent \$31.4 billion on its fight on terrorism in 2004–2005, far more than its \$1.7 billion monthly aid, according to the Institute of Public Policy's annual report from Beacon House National University (Beacon Report, 2008).

The Ministry of Finance estimates that between 2004-2005 and 2008-2009, Pakistan lost Rs. 2,083 billion as a result of the fight on terrorism. As can be seen, it was around Rs. 259.103 at the start of the fiscal year 2004-2005. The swift expansion it has experienced since then, when it reached Rs. 678 billion, has had an effect on the socioeconomic development of the country. Both direct and indirect expenses are included in this. The economy is suffering from lost revenue and employment opportunities, especially in war-torn areas, as well as from the cost of resettling thousands of displaced people in the FATA, Malakand, and Swat regions. If this tendency persisted, the costs—both direct and indirect—would increase. All of the country's largest cities, including Peshawar, Lahore,

Rawalpindi, and Islamabad, frequently experience terrorist strikes. (Ali, 2010)

Therefore, it is likely that the anticipated direct cost of the fight on terror will rise over the next years. Like direct expenses, indirect costs will rise in the future. The cost of terrorism would be significantly larger and worse for Pakistan's future if additional costs like looting, damage to infrastructure, particularly to girl schools, lost chances as a result of relocation and kidnapping, and loss of life were also taken into account. Finally, terrorism has hindered progress and placed a significant financial strain on the economy. Remember that the overall downturn in economic confidence, the difficulties in luring in foreign capital as a result, high transaction costs, and exorbitant military spending lead to economic inefficiencies that impede economic progress and exacerbate instability. However, by removing losses from lower commerce and investment, which are harmful to long-term economic growth, successful measures to prevent terrorism would have a significant beneficial impact on the economy.

4.1 Human Costs of Terrorism

The most evident result of a conflict is always the cost in human lives, and Pakistan is no different. Pakistan has paid a high price in terms of human lives for the War on Terror over the past twelve years. Pakistan has lost 49,000 lives since 2001, according to a report security groups sent to the Supreme Court of the nation on March 27, 2013. The Army is among the armed services that have suffered the most from the terrorist assaults, in addition to civilians. Rangers, Police, Levies Paramilitary Units, and Frontier Corps. Terrorists are also included in this figure; most of them were killed in military operations or drone strikes. The overall number of people killed by terrorist attacks, acts involving political and racial violence, sectarian

violence, targeted killings, even drone operations, may all be used to calculate the human cost of terrorism. The main cause is the close relationships that contemporary terrorist, sectarian, and ethno nationalist groups have with one another. (Afridi, 2014).

The Tehrik e Taliban (TTP) has gained notoriety for using beheadings, rocket attacks, suicide bombers, and remotely controlled explosives. The Naval War College, the FIA's Lahore office, the GHQ in Rawalpindi, the Hotel Marriott in Islamabad, the Navy's Mehran base in Karachi, the Wah Ordnance Factory, the Sri Lankan cricket team, and a police academy are just a few of the locations where it has extended its operations outside of Pakistan's tribal districts. Target killings, improvised explosive devices (IEDs), remote-control bombs, sabotage, suicide assaults, beheadings, landmines, rocket attacks hand grenades were common forms of violence used in attacks (Akbar, 2016).

The issue is the discrepancy in the numbers of human casualties, which have been reported by several security agencies in Pakistan and other research groups on a national and worldwide level. For instance, between 2002 and 2013, terrorist acts claimed the lives of over 24,000 individuals, including soldiers, law enforcement personnel, and civilians. People have become more expensive between 2007 and 2013. Since 2008, more than 25,000 additional civilians have perished as a result of military offensives against Taliban rebels in Pakistan's tribal regions (Ali, 2014). The Supreme Court received a report from a law enforcement agency that said that there have been 15,681 military fatalities in tribal areas since 2008. 57,344 injuries and roughly 52,671 fatalities are thought to have been caused by 18,634 terrorist assaults, according to multiple sources and figures. (Ministry of Finance, 2014).

Table-1 Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2000–2018

Pakistan's Terrorist Violence Death Toll, 2000–2018

Year	Civilians	Security Force Personnel	Terrorists/Insurgents	Total
2000	45	0	0	45
2001	29	9	0	38
2002	88	7	44	139

2003	140	24	25	189
2004	435	184	244	863
2005	430	81	137	648
2006	608	325	538	1471
2007	1522	597	1479	3598
2008	2155	654	3906	6715
2009	2324	991	8389	11704
2010	1796	469	5170	7435
2011	2738	765	2800	6303
2012	3007	732	2472	6211
2013	3001	676	1702	5379
2014	1781	533	3182	5496
2015	940	339	2403	3682
2016	612	293	898	1803
2017	540	208	512	1260
2018	48	53	54	155
Total	22239	6940	33955	63134

Source: Islamabad: Ministry of Interior - Federal Government, Official Data from 2000-2018.

4.2 Political Fallout of terrorism in Pakistan

The terrorism issue has regularly put Pakistan's state and its institutions under pressure during the last twelve years. In an effort to challenge the legitimacy of the state, terrorists and militant groups have publicly attacked and contested government institutions, notably security agencies. General Headquarters (GHQ) and the Mehran Base as well as military commanders and convoys, have all been threatened with attack from militants and terrorists. An additional aspect of terrorism in Pakistan is the rise in political killings over the previous ten years. Over the course of the last ten years of extremism, thousands of political officials and employees have been murdered. There is no one study that tracks political killings; the only ones that exist are an attack on former president Musharraf and attacks on Benazir Bhutto, the premier of Pakistan and the head of the PPP. Political killings have a history in Karachi, and the MQM and Sunni Tehreek have been blamed for the majority of these incidents. The number of political murders and kidnappings has increased in Baluchistan. Some background for the surge in political violence may be seen in the 298 political officials, activists, and workers who were assassinated between January and

May 2013 (Ansari, 2004)

4.3 An Upsurge of Violence between Sects

In Pakistan, sectarianism is not a recent development. Since the 1980s, there have been two terrifying decades of sectarian violence in Pakistan. Sectarianism continues to have a modest influence in the overall terrorist acts even after entering the fight against terrorism. In 2007, we first witnessed a rise in sectarian violence and warfare. Because the Taliban needed the tribal belt as a safe haven, sectarian tensions were used against the Shias of Parachinar in the Kurram agency. The Taliban sought to invade Afghanistan through Kurram, which was governed by Shias, despite the fact that they are predominantly Deobandis and anti-Shia. The Taliban's anti-Shia campaign in FATA did nothing more than fuel radical Shia organizations, which in turn reactivated the Taliban-backed Sunni extremist organizations throughout Pakistan. In Pakistan, particularly in the regions of Punjab and Baluchistan, sectarian violence has escalated dramatically since 2007. Growing sectarianism has the potential to destabilize not only Pakistan but the whole region, as Pakistan is home to the second-largest Shia population in the world, behind Iran. Shias have historically accounted for at least 70% of targets of sectarian violence, whereas the number of incidents involving inter-sectarian

conflict has climbed to thirty-five (Zahab, 2004).

The Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, an illicit alliance of extremist organizations, thought to be in charge of the majority of nationwide violence, has weakened as a result of internal conflict and fragmentation. Rebels and militants are moving from rural regions like FATA to urban areas more frequently as a result of military operations. This may provide better protection from drones and other cutting-edge preventative

measures, but it also increases national instability. As a result, Pakistan is witnessing an increase in sectarian and religious violence. A recent surge in sectarian violence that mostly affected the Shia population occurred in Pakistan between January 2012 and June 2013. Some of the TTP's dissident groups have grown into extreme sects that are waging conflict with Quetta's and Karachi's Shia communities. These sectarian assaults will still occur in many parts of Pakistan in the future. (Ahmad, 2002).

Table-2 Province/Region-level Statistics on Sectarian Conflict Deaths, 2013–2018

Province/ Region	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	Total
Sindh	239	231	180	42	101	11	804
Baluchistan	213	86	33	73	51	18	474
Federally Administered Tribal Area	68	15	31	36	153	43	346
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa	154	60	32	16	07	08	277
Punjab	29	23	28	79	10	11	180
Islamabad Capital Territory	05	06	05	00	02	00	18
Azad Jammu & Kashmir	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Gilgit Baltistan	00	00	00	00	00	00	00
Total	708	421	309	246	324	91	2,099

Source: Annual Security Report 2018. Islamabad: Centre for Research & Security Studies, 2019.

4.4 Drone Attacks and Targeted Killing

The US promotes the use of drones as weapons in the 21st century. Since Pakistan, a country that is not at war with the US, uses them to execute prospective terrorists right away, they are the topic of a lot of debate. The US hasn't offered any legal rationale for drone attacks. The CIA's use of US drones in FATA has resulted in a substantial number of fatalities, injuries, and impairments. Nek Mohammad, the Taliban commander, was among the three people murdered in Pakistan's first drone strike in the South Waziristan village of Dhok in November 2004. The primary goal of drone attacks is too

surgically and accurately target terrorists; however, a significant number of civilians also die or are injured as a result. (Gusterson, 2019).

4.5 Target Killings

Another consequence of Pakistan's war on terrorism is the targeting of a particular group, be it sectarian (Shias) or institutionalized (political and military). However, for a variety of reasons, and by a variety of organizations, these operations are primarily carried out in Karachi and Baluchistan. A UN Special Report on Target Killing (UN Report, 2022) defines target killings as premeditated acts of deadly force used intentionally against a person or people who have been specifically chosen in advance by the perpetrator. The use of lethal force is the mission-specific objective of a

targeted killing. This distinguishes intentional, negligent, accidental, or reckless homicides from targeted killings. The phrase "targeted killing" has gained popularity since Israel made its targeting of accused terrorists in the Palestinian territories public in 2000, despite the fact that international law does not define it expressly. Lethal force can be used in many different ways, including cruise missiles, drone assaults, and special operations raids. These actions are often taken by an intelligence of a nation. The idea of "targeted execution" helps to justify the US drone campaign against terrorists in the FATA region of Pakistan, but it is unable to account for the target killing methods used by militants, radicals, criminal gangs, and organizations that some political parties secretly support. Target killings are a successful tactic employed by political groups in Karachi in order to settle grudges in territorial disputes as well as by sectarian organizations to kill Sunnis and Shi'as. The data in the table below will show you the many kinds of target killings Karachi has seen during the last five years (Pakistan Today, 2023).

The target killings in Baluchistan, however, are rather different considering the reports that security agents carry out these assassinations most of the time. Most incidents of tortured bodies found in various province areas as well as cases of missing people are blamed on security agents. This, meanwhile, is debatable considering that in Baluchistan, in addition to political personalities and employees, a large number of police officers, security personnel, and government officials have also been targeted. Target killing mapping in Baluchistan has encountered difficulties as a result of a lack of knowledge and resources and dependence on any stories in the media that are available, whether they are reliable or not. The Baluchistan Chapter of the Pakistani Human Rights

Commission has thus far been unable to provide even the most fundamental details in this regard. Target killings have been attributed to Baluchistan Liberation Tigers, Lashkar e Baluchistan, Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ), Baluchistan Liberation Front (BLF), the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) and Tehreek-e-Nifaz e Aman Baluchistan in some cases (Human) Rights Watch, 2011). From January to September 2013, there were 92 events (including the deaths of 19 political persons) and 104 attacks (including fatalities). Lashkar-e-Jhangvi (LeJ) was deemed responsible for the killings of the eighty-three Hazara Shias who were murdered in Quetta in January 2013. But in Balochistan, target killings often have an ethnic component, which is often used by outsiders who wish for Pakistan to be weak and unstable (Shahid, 2021).

4.6 The Psychological Impact of Terrorism

The instigation of terrorism by terrorists has rendered Pakistanis' communal lives immobile. Due to the unpredictable and fear-filled atmosphere in public locations like marketplaces, parks, and even mosques, people avoid coming there. According to Pakistan's 1973 Constitution, the state's fundamental duty is to safeguard citizens' lives, property, and honour. Unfortunately, the government is powerless to ensure that each and every one of its citizens is safe. Due to the increase in terrorism, there is now an existential threat to the internal security of Pakistan (Tellis, 2008). It frequently understated the psychological toll that terrorism has taken on Pakistani culture as a whole. The main cause of this is that discussing psychological problems and concerns is frowned upon in South Asian society. Additionally, there is a serious financing shortage that prevent the general community and individuals impacted by terrorist attacks from receiving the necessary rehabilitation. (Schuster, 2009).

Table-4 Suicide Attacks – 2008-2013

Year	No of Attacks	Killed	Injured
2008	63	967	2130
2009	87	1299	3633
2010	68	1187	2926

2011	45	676	1462
2012	33	239	413
2013	32	596	1100
Total	328	4,964	11,664

Sources: Abbasi, Nadia Mushtaq (2013). "Impact of Terrorism on Pakistan," *Strategic Studies*, Vol. 33, No. 2 (Summer 2013).

4.8 Economic Losses of Terrorism

Loss of life, damaging of infrastructure and property, and a drop in short- term economic activity are among the immediate effects of terrorist acts. Terrorism also encourages skepticism, undermines confidence, and raises the impression of risk, which decreases investment rates and slows the pace of economic growth. Pakistan lost important lives and infrastructure in addition to an estimated \$35 to \$40 billion between 2001 and 2002, according to government data (Ali, 2014). Due to both internal problems and the global financial crisis, Pakistan's economy grew by only 2.00% in fiscal year 2009, thereby ending the country's economic expansion. Almost three million people were forcibly evicted as a result of security forces' crackdown on terrorism in Afghanistan's bordering Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (Former NWFP) and the former Federally Administrated Tribal Areas (FATA). The war on terror and the internal displacement of people (IDPs) accounted for a sizeable portion of the financial resources, which widened the budget gap and limited economic expansion. Pakistan has been the most affected by the war on terrorism of all the countries. Because to terrorism, the Pakistani economy was severely harmed. Even though there are other factors that should be taken into account, such as devastating floods that devastated the agriculture system nearly every, the global financial crisis of 2009, a major interruption in the industrial sector's energy supplies and an undemocratic administration, this decline cannot be entirely attributed to terrorism (Michael, 2007; Shukla, 2015).

The bulk of Pakistan has been affected by the war, which has harmed the nation's economy overall. The economy has been severely

impacted by the problems with internal security, both in terms of the direct expenses of combating extremism and the ripple effects on investment arrivals and confidence in the markets. Less fiscal room for necessary growth and social sector investment has had a severe collateral effect on Pakistan, hindering immediate economic prospects. The precise cost of the war against terrorism cannot be predicted. According to the annual Economic Survey for 2010-2011 published by the Ministry of Finance, a preliminary estimate of expenditures incurred by Pakistan during the last ten years from 2001 comes to almost \$68 billion. Pakistan's fiscal year 2001–02 saw losses ranging from \$2.669 billion to \$2.749 billion in the fiscal year (2002-03), \$2.932 billion in the fiscal year (2003-04), \$3.410 billion in the fiscal year (2004-05), \$4.670 billion in the fiscal year (2006-07), \$6.940 billion in the fiscal year (2007-08), \$9.180 billion in the fiscal year (2008-09), \$13.560 billion in the fiscal year (2009-10), and \$17. (Khalid, 2014).

4.11 Internally Displaced People (IDPs)

Pakistan launched five significant military operations against the Taliban in retaliation for their 2009 Malakand Division violation of the Nizam-e-Adl Regulation: Operation Rah-e-Rast in Malakand Division, Operation Rah-e-Nijaat in South Waziristan Agency, Operation Kwakhbadesh in Khyber Agency and Operation Dargahlam, Bia Dargahlam. Sectarian violence, military combating terrorism and counterinsurgency operations, and other circumstances led to mass population movement in FATA and KPK (Yadav, 2021). Since 2004, the conflict in Pakistan's Khyber Pakhtunkhwa region has caused almost 5 million people to become internally displaced. A June 2013 study by IDMC indicated that millions of internally displaced individuals remain unregistered and that over 1.1 million people have been forced from their homes in the North West. The Khyber

and Kurram Agencies in FATA are the most badly impacted. On top of the nearly 415,000 newly displaced persons in 2012, at least 131,000 additional people have left their homes since March 2013 (Chaudhry, 2014). The UNHCR has counted 1.1 million internally displaced persons (IDPs), but there are undoubtedly many more in the neighbourhood and elsewhere. A 2013 UNHCR study states that the majority are from the Orakzai (21,000 households), Khyber Agency (83,000 households), South Waziristan (36,000 households), and Kurram (34,000 households).

Additionally, many IDPs are not registered. About 34% of the displaced individuals in the KP were remained unregistered by the end of 2012. Families from the following regions are included in this: Khyber, Hangu, Kurram, South Waziristan, Tank, Orakzai, Bajaur and Mohmand. Large-scale returns have been observed in a few locations, including Swat, where 90% of the IDPs have returned (Dawn, 2013). Other circumstances, like the majority of the Agencies, have had lower return rates than anticipated because military operations have mostly destroyed the infrastructure and means of livelihood, leaving what is left vulnerable to drone attacks. As a result, US drone attacks in FATA have a big impact on the region's forced migration.

Despite the fact that the majority of IDPs tend to squander government resources, the long-term financial losses and psychological pain brought on by being forced out of one's hearth and home after witnessing a family member's murder are enormous. Strong resentment and disdain that are afterwards fostered toward the Pakistani military and administration for removing them serves as a breeding ground for new terrorist actions and makes people easy targets for militant organizations (IDMC Report, 2020). Security problems are exacerbated by high unemployment rates and the influx of people from rural to semi-urban and metropolitan areas. There are now around 1.6 million Afghan refugees registered there, and an additional 1 million are awaiting registration, in addition to the nearly 15 million IDPs from the 2016 floods, Pakistan also has the largest and longest-running

refugee caseload in the world (UNHCR Report). These figures do not account for the roughly 15 million IDPs who are a result of internal displacement due to conflict. Rebuilding FATA would be extremely costly at this time, despite the fact that the Pakistani government has been keen to assist with the resettlement and restoration of the internally displaced people following the 2005 earthquake.

4.16 Social Cost of Terrorism

Terrorism may have a significant influence on a State's economy, which could lead to poverty, homelessness, unemployment, and other social and economic issues. The Ministry of Finance claims that due to the high unemployment rates in the afflicted areas, Pakistan's participation in the fight against terrorism has significantly increased rural poverty in the country. It climbed to 37.5% from 23.9% in 2007-2008 (Ministry of Finance Report, 2010). The provision of basic social services such as education and health, as well as housing, food, water, and sanitation, is also necessary for internally displaced persons. The nation's socioeconomic structure has suffered greatly as a result of frequent terrorist strikes and population relocation, especially in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa and the old FATA. Due to increased volatility and uncertainty in the country's socioeconomic situation, the World Bank in the same way has limited market-based loan lending of at least \$834 million (Sandler, 2015).

Prior to the national crisis, 28% of Swat Youth Front survey participants reported monthly household incomes of more than Rs. 40,000, while only 8% indicated incomes of less than Rs. 5,000 (SYF Report, 2015). Following the crisis, just 4% of respondents claimed to make at least Rs. 30,000 per month, while 35% reported having no income at all. The majority of households in this segment of the population are run by employees, business owners, and farmers. Current curfews and the removal of fruit orchards and agricultural land as a result of neighborhood security activities are the primary causes of a lack of economic potential. The future of Pakistan's educational system is significantly impacted by terrorism as well. The NWFP Department of Education claims that the

destruction or damage to schools has had an effect on the education of students in the province. This includes 35% of the schools in the districts of Buner, Shangla, Upper and Lower Dir, Malakand, and 65% of the schools in Swat. Majority of those impacted live in the Swat region where terrorists have outlawed female education. However, attacks on schools for girls have not been limited to Swat. Furthermore, about 42 percent of the boys' schools in Swat were damaged, according to Abbasi (2013).

An estimated 150,000 students have been stopped from receiving an education due to the insurgency, and 8,000 female teachers have lost their jobs as a result. In addition, more than 190 government schools in Pakistan's Swat region were destroyed by fire, displacing around 45,504 of the kids who attended them (Hilali, 2008). Sohail Lashari, a former senior vice-president of the LCCI, claims that the Swat war has caused violence in other parts of the country, increased unemployment, cut off youth education, uprooted the area's main source of income, uprooted two million people, severely damaged infrastructure, and halted the supply of vital raw materials from Swat, such as marble, gems, jewelry, and furniture industry. In actuality, the nation's socioeconomic structure was severely impacted, especially in the challenging northern areas, by the worsening law and order conditions, the frequent bombings, and the expulsion of the local people.

Institutional stagnation, or perhaps degeneration, and the political leadership's lack of attention to the interests of the general population both need to be closely watched. Because of these two trends, Pakistanis are becoming less dependent on the government and more independent. Religious radicals and other non-governmental actors have united to blur the lines between the state and the individual in vital social domains like education and justice. This scenario has led to the emergence of new non-state allegiances that may conflict with official goals. As a result, the government's ability to influence the "hearts and minds" and behavior of its citizens is waning. The Pakistani government should show its importance to its citizens rather

than trying to control their life. Pakistan is a developing nation where political representative institutions have not advanced greatly and the army is still a significant political force. It is crucial to emphasize that, like all other political actors in Pakistan, the army will continue to pursue the religious rights for political goals without examining the cause of its involvement in politics. It is not advantageous nor possible in the short term to address the question of the military's political involvement in combating religious extremism. However, Pakistan's military should ideally cut all relations with the jihadist militant groups involved in the uprising in Kashmir as soon as possible. Only if the conflict with India is settled.

Taking into account the aforementioned, this study came to the conclusion that rather than representing a break or a change from the past, Pakistan's 2001 policy shift towards Afghanistan was a continuation of the same national security policy goals that had previously shaped Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan, including its backing of the Taliban. Pakistan was afforded the opportunity to enhance its military prowess due to the resumption of access to US military and financial aid, which had been interrupted after the Soviet withdrawal. Additionally, Pakistan could have preserved its standing as a major player in Afghanistan by becoming an ally in the US-led war on terror. Joining the US war on terror as a partner gives Pakistan the opportunity to strengthen its military against its eastern rival as well as its own national security and survival. Following the September 11 attacks, General Musharraf took actions that may be rationally attributed to the necessity to obtain financial and military resources, protect against external military threats, and stay relevant in regional power struggles.

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