

Unraveling the climate threads: Navigating the impact of climate change on Pakistan-India relations



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Abstract: *In today's globalized world, environmental issues are going to perform a key role in the social and financial development of states, particularly developing countries, in the near future. Pakistan and India are two neighboring countries with a long history and many similarities. However, relations between the two have been strained by many activities and problems since the birth of the two countries. Climate change is expected to bring significantly more non-traditional threats to Pakistan and India than traditional ones in the near future. India is the fifth most affected state by climate change while Pakistan is the seventh most affected country. Therefore, this article examined that how climate change impact on Pakistan-India relations. To answer this question, this paper offers a brief qualitative and descriptive examination of the interactions between two countries. The paper concludes that environmental deterioration is already having a substantial impact, whether due to shifting climatic patterns or an upsurge in the incidence of catastrophic events. It is believed that diplomacy offers both countries an opportunity to abandon their traditional hostility and continue working to normalize relations and reduce tensions along their shared border, as well as usher in a new era of cooperation to achieve this problem to address looming threats from climate change.*

Keywords: Pakistan, India, Climate change, Relations.

Introduction

In the 21st century, the rivalry is exacerbated by increasing environmental catastrophe, which includes the effects of human-caused climate change. South Asia has been recognized as one of the most susceptible to climate change. Extreme and changing rainfall patterns, water shortages, droughts, floods, sea level rise and increased coastal cyclone activity are all climate threats in the subcontinent. Climate change and irregular weather conditions have a negative impact on economic growth and development

(R.K. Pachauri, 2007). These changes cause the greatest damage, especially in developing countries such as Pakistan and India. Pakistan is in the top ten while India is at number five as both countries are severely affected by climate change (Javed 2013).

Pakistan and India are two developing countries that have been most affected by climate change, particularly in the shape of catastrophic inundations and famine like conditions across the state in recent years. Both states are struggling with food and water insecurity due to

water shortages and ecological degradation, making the nation facing water stress. The poor world faces the mounting hazards of climatic change and is thus unable to adequately address this problem because of absence resources and technological know-how. The neighboring states are severely reliant on the water that flows in the foremost river system of the Indus Basin. According to the UN World Water Development Report 2012 (The United Nations World Water Development Report 4, 2012) because of climatic changes and global warming, the Himalayan glaciers are retreating at a high speed, leading to more uncertainty over the quantity and quality of water supplies in the long term. Lower water accessibility results in smaller irrigated area, leading to food and water insecurity in Pakistan and India and directly affecting the country's economic development.

In addition to traditional security challenges, Pakistan and India have faced a variety of non-traditional security risks in recent decades, with obvious implications. State and territorial integrity have been a cornerstone of their national policies since 1947 and have ultimately been reflected in their respective foreign policies. Climate change, environmental stressors, natural disasters, epidemic diseases, open border disputes and energy crises are examples of non-traditional security risks in Pakistan and India. However, cyber-attacks, drug trafficking, unregulated migration, food and water crisis are all comprised (Caballera-Anthony 2016). These concerns go beyond the traditional territorial security strategy and relate to human security. Non-traditional security threats are global in nature, extend beyond the military sector, and arise in unforeseen ways that are critical to human security (Khan R. M. 2009). Pakistan and India are the states most affected by the climate change, as neither both countries have the appropriate resources to counteract or even mitigate the effects of climate change and environmental concerns on their own.

Therefore, water is the primary avenue through which climate change presents itself in Pakistan-India rivalry, especially in the shared Indus River Basin (IRB), which is now regulated by

the Indus Waters Treaty (IWT). So, this area is the main focus of this article. Deep differences over the IWT are becoming increasingly relevant in the conflict. Both parties have recently escalated their allegations of unlawful water use by the other side. Climate change is projected to have significant impacts on the IRB (and the rest of the subcontinent) as we approach mid-century and beyond, further complicating the water debate. This paper examines the bilateral relations between Pakistan and India from the perspective of environmental peacebuilding and provides a forum for cooperation on mutual environmental issues. The scope of this article is limited to climate change and environmental concerns as non-traditional security threats faced by Pakistan and India.

Methodology

The methodology of this article is descriptive qualitative and analytical. The water relationship between Pakistan and India was further examined by presenting data from the available literature on the subject. To achieve plausible results, both secondary and primary data sources are used. Secondary sources included journal articles, books and studies from non-governmental organizations, research institutes etc. Primary resources comprised excerpts from primary documents such as the IWT etc.

Water Security and Adherence to Climate Change

Resources of water are extremely important. They are all needed in households, agriculture, industry, leisure and the environmental actions. Though, water supplies in Pakistan and India have recently come under significant pressure due to industrial progress, urbanization, growing populations and ecological contamination. Combined with inadequate water management and growing instability in rain and climate patterns, this puts people's water supplies at risk. Water security is described as the continuous accessibility of acceptable quantities and water quality for health, livelihoods, and productivity, together with an adequate degree of water-related hazards (Sadoff, 2015).

India had 728 billion m³ of drinking water in 2009. Compared to this supply, water request is expected to rise to 1093 billion m³ by 2025. Consequently, water accessibility per capita is projected to decline to 1341 m³ in 2025 from 1820 m³ in 2001. Based on average water consumption for numerous functions, when per capita water availability is between 1000 and 1700 m³ per year, it is said to be water stressed, and of water scarcity when availability falls below 1000 m³ per year. Maximum Indian states are expected to experience water scarcity by 2020 and water scarcity by 2025 (Hedge, BAIF Development). Likewise, in Pakistan water accessibility per capita is projected to decline from 1672 m³ in 1990 to 837 m³ in 2025, making the situation worse than India (Majeed, 2012).

Climate Resilience in the Region

Climate change affects all countries, it affects them in different ways and to different degrees. India, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Maldives, Nepal and Afghanistan are among the regions most affected by climate change. Poverty, population size, heavy dependence on agriculture and geographical location are the main reasons for this. Climate change is projected to worsen the situation in both Pakistan and India. Pakistan and India have populace of over 1.4 billion, over 300 million underprivileged people (living on less than \$1.9 a day) and over 650 million individuals work in agriculture, making them extremely vulnerable to the environmental change (The World Bank).

As temperatures rise, evaporation increases, potentially leading to droughts. Furthermore, growing temperatures are causing glaciers to melt at an unprecedented rate. Glacier melt could cause severe freshwater shortages in communities that rely on it. This is exacerbated by the fact that warmer temperatures mean additional precipitation will fall in the form of rain rather than snow. Consequently, rising soil moisture and recharge of groundwater are less likely, and regions that depend on melting of snow as their principal cause of fresh water may face increased water scarcity. Climate change, on the other hand, is anticipated to upsurge extreme rain and precipitation intensity, possibly contributing to flooding. The frequency

and severity of hurricanes will also be augmented by climatic changes, which frequently create national catastrophes. Lastly, rising sea levels because of climate change could cause flooding, alter sediment balance, and cause salt water to enter the land mass via rivers and contaminate groundwater (GRACE Communications Foundation).

Due to its fragile state, this area is already heavily affected by climatic changes, in spite of producing only 7% of global greenhouse gas emissions in 2012 (Country Greenhouse Gas Emissions Data, 2014). Presently this area is experiencing increasing temperatures, more variable rainfall, more extreme weather events (as well as severe floods, droughts and storms), and sea level rise. These fluctuations had an impact on the region's revenue growth as well as the daily lives and livelihoods of millions of impoverished individuals (Field, 2014).

These consequences are projected to intensify in future because not much progress has been achieved in reducing and adapting to them. Extraordinary and unprecedented heat waves are predicted to become much more frequent in the future and will extend over much larger regions in Pakistan and India. Rain is likely to become more irregular. Sudden fluctuations in the monsoon could trigger a key disaster and lead to more frequent droughts and floods. Due to the high heat, crop yields are projected to drop dramatically by the 2040s. Although groundwater levels cannot be predicted in the future, declining groundwater levels can be expected to continue to decline due to augmented water demands from a rising populace, more rich lifestyles, and service and industry sectors. Glacier melting and diminished snow cover in the Himalayas are anticipated to put glacier-fed rivers, notably the Indus and Brahmaputra, in jeopardy. Changes in the Indus, Ganges, and Brahmaputra rivers might have a considerable impact on irrigation, lowering the food quantity and that can be generated in their basins and jeopardizing the livelihoods of millions. On the subcontinent, sea levels will rise quicker than at higher latitudes. Sea-level upsurge and storm rise may cause saltwater to enter into coastal areas, causing agricultural

disruption, reducing groundwater quality, polluting drinking water, and potentially contributing to an increase in diarrheal infections and cholera outbreaks. In addition, periodic water shortages, rising temperatures and seawater intrusion could affect crop production and threaten the state's food security. If existing tendencies linger, substantial yield losses for wheat and rice are to be projected in the short and medium term. River flow fluctuations and continuing declines can pose significant challenges to hydroelectric power plants and raise the hazard of physical loss from landslides, flash floods, glacial lake outbursts and other climate-related natural calamities. Climatic changes are too predicted to have a significant impact on health, leading to an increase in starvation and associated health problems. Heat waves are expected to lead to a significant increase in mortality and deaths. Environmental change impact on cultivation and livelihoods could boost the total number of climate refugees and cause societal unrest (The World Bank 2013).

Climate change's effects are and will be most intensely felt by those who are financially, politically, organizationally, or culturally oppressed. In Pakistan and India individuals who live in impoverishment, women, children, the elderly, the disabled, tribal publics, those living along seashores and banks of rivers, as well as those whose livelihoods rely on agriculture will all be included. Considering these states' vulnerabilities and the effects that they suffer; it is critical that they enhance their climate resilience. The system ability and its components to timely and efficiently anticipate, engross, manage or recover from the impacts of a potentially dangerous event, including maintaining, restoring or advancing its vital basic structures and functions, is defined as resilience (Field, 2012).

The terms climate adaptation and climate resilience are frequently used similarly. Though, resilience encompasses a larger concept than adaptability. Usually, adaptation entails particular actions made by those making decisions in reaction to a present or projected threat that exceed an appropriate effect threshold

such as building urban canopies to provide shade when heat waves become more frequent and stronger. Resilience comprises adaptation measures, but as well takes into account a society's overall adaptability and its ongoing ability to develop this ability. In the case of the heat wave, a focus on resilience could also stimulate discussions about how cooling centers could surge the participation of underrepresented people in a diversity of actions (and also offer protection in other crises, leaving them less at risk and better connected). A resilient society is not only able to absorb impacts and changes, but also use them to create a recreating capacity (Second Nature).

Both Pakistan and India recognize the significance of climate change and have implemented state plans and programs to combat climate change. India launched its first National Climate Change Action Plan (NAPCC) in June 2008, which describes current and future strategies and programs to reduce and adapt to climate change. The strategy defined eight key national missions, such as the solar mission, the energy efficiency mission, the strategic knowledge mission for climate change and so on. India then submitted their State Action Plans for Climate Change (SAPCC) and are currently in the implementation phase. Likewise, in September 2012, Pakistan announced its National Climate Change Policy, which offers a framework for examining the difficulties that Pakistan is facing or may confront in upcoming time because of climate change. This strategy emphasizes the numerous mitigation and adaptation programs that Pakistan must implement. Both states have a National Disaster Management Authority.

India officially submitted its Intended Nationally Determined Contribution (INDC) to the Paris Climate Agreement in October 2015. Its main elements were to decrease the productions intensity of its GDP by thirty three to thirty five percent by 2030 compared to 2005 levels, to attain a growing electricity share of about 40 percent by 2030, using technology transmission and low-cost international financing, as well as from the Green Climate Fund (GCF) to generate installed capacity from

non-fossil fuel based energy sources and generate further carbon sink of 2.5 to 3 billion tons of CO₂ equal through further forest and tree cover. Pakistan also presented its INDC in November 2015, in which it maintained its intention to reduce peak emissions as much as possible, subject to affordability, the provision of international climate finance, technology transmission and capacity building, and made it clear that only by doing so would Pakistan be able to make concrete commitments once reliable data on peak emissions levels becomes available. In September 2015, both states agreed to implement the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Environmental change fundamental issue that will impact the success of entire additional goals, in addition to the agenda-set goal of taking immediate action to address climate change and its effects.

Nevertheless, given the magnitude of the issue, any efforts by Pakistan and India to tackle climate change on their own are likely to be inadequate. It is crucial that both countries work together to achieve meaningful progress. These countries can learn a lot from each other, particularly in the solar energy sector. In India, the solar energy business is well established, while Pakistan has only recently commenced to develop this sector, after changing its efficacy regulations to permit individuals to sell excess power back to the grid and reducing import duties on solar panels. Historically, these two countries have been unable to work together to advance human growth. Failure to address climate change because of poor two-sided relationships will be damaging to both sides and potentially generate conditions that increase tensions. For instance, if India invests extensively in hydropower to satisfy its energy requirements in a sustainable manner, it may affect Pakistan's downstream water supplies. Furthermore, in South Asia Pakistan and India must collaborate with other countries, one of the world's least politically linked areas, to advance a regional climate plan, which is now lacking (Bhatiya, 2015).

Tracing the history of Pakistan-India relations

British India disintegrated in 1947 and two

sovereign states emerged: Pakistan and India. This period was marked by significant sectarianism, including killings, sexual assault, burning, and coerced conversions particularly along the borders of newly founded countries (William, 2017). After Partition, millions of Muslims from India travelled to West and East wing of Pakistan, while millions of Hindus and Sikhs travelled from Pakistan to India, resulting in one of the largest mass migrations in human history. Between 12 and 15 million individuals were displaced and 1 to 2 million died (Kaushik, 2017). The Partition is still seen as crucial to the identity of the Indian subcontinent. Both countries maintained diplomatic relations shortly after partition. However, these neighboring states have fought three main wars and their relations have been unfriendly, at times violent and viewed with suspicion over the past half century. The disputed region of Kashmir is the focus of most hostilities. Both sides have taken various steps to improve relations, including the Delhi-Lahore bus service and the 2003 ceasefire agreement. Several terrorist attacks, including the attack on the Indian Parliament by militants coming from across the Pakistan boundary, the Samjhauta Express bombing that killed 68 people, most of whom were Pakistanis, and attacks by militants from Pakistan in 2008 in Mumbai these attempts were foiled (Kaushik, 2017).

Recently, Pakistan and Indian governments have made efforts to improve their bilateral relations. Prime Minister Modi's invitation to Prime Minister Sharif to join his inauguration as Prime Minister in 2013 is a case in point (Boone, 2014). On the Indian side of the boundary, terrorist attacks in Pathankot and Uri have undermined these positive developments (Iyengar, 2016). Water is not treated in isolation, at least not in India. Water is becoming more and more used as a diplomatic tool and a negotiating chip in order to deal other vital foreign policy matters. The volatile nature of Pak-India relations has twisted a climate of mistrust that averts cooperation. One such region is the managing of the transboundary waters of the Indus, which not only creates in the undecided Kashmir region but also serves as the lifeblood

of Pakistan's economy.

Water Weaponization

The IRB is a transboundary river basin formed by the Himalayan Mountains and the Tibetan Plateau. The distribution of the IRB between Pakistan and India highlights the importance of the basin to the lives of billions of people. Since Pakistan and India are known for their agriculture, so millions of people and their livelihoods depend on its waters and tributaries. The contribution of agriculture to the GDP of Pakistan and India has declined in recent decades. Agriculture contributed 18% of GDP in 2020, a number that is declining (Economic Survey of India (2019-2020)). Pakistan, on the other hand, has experienced similar patterns. Agriculture's share of GDP was only 19.3% in 2020 (Economic Survey of Pakistan (2019-20)). Current water resource trends in Pakistan and India suggest the possibility of future water wars as well as coercive diplomacy between Pakistan and India. Water shortages along the IRB have forced India to build dams along the water supply flowing through Pakistan, which has already led to the weaponization of water and could lead to India violating the IWT. Therefore, it is high time for Pakistan and India to make optimal use of the Indus Permanent Commission platform for cooperation and water resources management while taking climate-related changes in the region into account.

The Indus Water Treaty

After the division of the subcontinent in 1947, a boundary Commission worked diligently to guarantee that the both Pakistan and India shared water resources in the Indus Basin. But India cut off Pakistan's water supply in 1948, impacting millions of individuals. The two régimes then attempted to exchange a water-sharing treaty, but were unsuccessful. Eventually, the World Bank, had to intervene to negotiate a water-sharing agreement. This negotiation procedure lasted well over twelve years. The preliminary aim was to promote bilateral collaboration to utilize the Indus waters as a common resource. The water resource sharing plan was revised because of a lack of mutual trust between the two administrations (Indus Waters Treaty: View

From Kashmir, 2006). The treaty gave India exclusive control of the eastern Ravi, Sutlej and Beas rivers, while Indus, Jhelum and Chenab rivers handed over to Pakistan. The two governments then signed the IWT in 1960. Even in times of war, the IWT banned the use of water as a weapon of war. Pakistan and India have waged legal battles over the years over irrigation and dam projects on the Indus. Together with the climate change effects, the Kashmir issue and inhabitants' pressures have endangered inland waterway transport and twisted a situation conducive to water skirmish.

Prominent features of the IWT:

1. The Indus water supply was divided; Pakistan was given exclusive rights to the three western rivers Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab while India was given exclusive rights to the three eastern rivers Sutlej, Ravi, and Beas.
2. India is entitled to build Run-of-River (ROR) hydroelectric power projects on western rivers with specified design limits for power generation, as well as to use certain quantities of water from western rivers for domestic non-consumptive activities and to store certain quantities as specified in the contract. The agreement likewise needs India to allow the free flow of water to Pakistan beyond a certain limit specified in the accord.
3. The treaty entails Pakistan and India to notify each other of any engineering projects that could affect the flow of water to ensure impacts. India must notify Pakistan 6 months in advance and Pakistan must notify India 3 months in advance.
4. A Permanent Indus Commission with representatives from both states maintains contact on entirely issues mentioned in the accord.
5. The PIC is the first step in managing conflict. If PIC fails to resolve the matter, the decision will be made by an impartial panel of experts for technical issues or an adjudication tribunal for legal issues.
6. Article VII calls for "Future Cooperation" between Pakistan and Indian states in areas such as data sharing and collaboration on technical projects.

After the signing of the pact, Pakistan began construction of the Mangla and Tarbela dams, as well as five dams, a siphon and eight connecting canals between rivers.³⁸ The result was the construction of the major adjoining canal network around the globe, complementing the prevailing 6 barrages and 35 canals in the IRB (Qadir, 2008). Despite the ratification of the IWT, water conflicts frequently occurred in the two countries. These include:

Kishanganga Dam

The project envisages the construction of a 103 m high dam on the Kishanganga (Neelum) River in Kanzalwan to divert water from Kishanganga to Wular Lake via tunnels. The dam has a power production capacity of 330 MW. Pakistan has opposed to the scheme, claiming it violates the IWT. The dam will have a significant impact on Pakistan's planned 969 MW Neelum hydropower project on the Neelum River. The two countries have not yet reached an agreement on this matter (Sihai, 2007).

Baglihar Dam

This is a hydropower project on Pakistan's Chenab River. In 1992, the dam strategy was developed, certified in 1996, and in 1999 construction commenced (Ejolt). The IWT compels India to notify Pakistan 6 months before the start of any engineering activity that may impair water flow. In 1992, when the project plan for construction of a hydroelectric power plant in Baglihar was drawn up, India informed Pakistan in advance. The government of Pakistan objected to the project's design parameters, claiming it desecrated the pact. Pakistan stated that the project design gave India excessive power to control (accelerate, slow down and block) the flow of the Chenab River, giving India strategic influence in times of political conflict. Due to Pakistan's concerns, the neighboring states exchanged data on the project through the PIC on behalf of the IWT over the next seven years. As the exchange of information did not result in a compromise, the PIC held its first structured discussion on the project in May 2000. However, a series of discussions between the commissioners revealed some outstanding issues that persisted

unanswered.

As part of the next steps in line with the IWT, Pakistan notified India of its intention to approach the World Bank to request the appointment of neutral experts. India responded by proposing bilateral ministerial-level talks between the neighboring states to resolve the issue. Pakistan agreed to this on three conditions: A. a halt to development in Balighar; B. permission to view the site; and C. a deadline for resolution. These conditions were discussed at numerous technical and official meetings. Because of the lack of advancement in bargaining, Pakistan requested the World Bank to assign an impartial expert. Professor Raymond Lafitte, a Swiss civil engineer, as a neutral expert was appointed by the World Bank to decide on the issue after ensuring that both administrations had completed all the obligatory preparatory procedures to resolve the matter. Professor Lafitte met with a delegation from the Pakistan Ministry of Water and Energy and visited various locations with them. Professor Lafitte submitted his concluding judgment in February 2007, two years after selecting the neutral expert (Indus Waters Treaty - Articles and Annexures. Baglihar Decision - Expert Determination). It was decided to build the Baglihar Dam with some slight technical changes to address some of Pakistan's apprehensions such as lowering the height of the dam by 1.5 meters. The power intake tunnels were increased by 3 meters, dropping the flow control abilities of the previous design. The final ruling vetoed numerous of Pakistan's objections and found that the design met current technical standards. Pakistan expressed dissatisfaction with the verdict but agreed to accept it. At the meeting of the PIC's two commissioners in June 2010, Pakistan and India discussed the final problem about the Baglihar Dam's imminent filling. The matter was deemed addressed, and Pakistan committed not to bring it up afterwards (Kaushik, 2017).

Dulhasti Hydropower Project

The completed project has a storage capacity of 9,000 acres and is sited upstream of the Baglihar Hydropower Project (Adil, 2007). Although it is a small, low-impact project, Pakistan opposes it

to deter India from undertaking similar projects on the eastern rivers.

Wular Barrage

The Wular Barage issue remains unresolved. India has proposed to build a barrier to increase water flow along the Jhelum River, cover a 20-kilometer stretch between Sopur and Barmulla, create a storage capacity of 300,000 acre-feet and achieve a power production of 960 megawatts. Wular Barrage, on the other hand, began in 1984 and ended in 1987 due to Pakistan's resistance. The Pakistan argument was

1. The barrier would result in a daily change in water flow.
2. This would be a desecration of the provision of the IWT of 1960, which prohibits India from developing storage facilities (except for limited quantities for flood control).
3. This would be detrimental to Pakistan's three-canal system including Indus, Jhelum and Sutlej (Azhar, 2021).

Collaboration Under the Banner of 'Loss and Damage'

The 27th Conference of the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change took place on November 2022 in Sharm El Shiekh, Egypt (Khan O. F., 2023). During the conference, participants agreed on an extraordinary agreement - "Loss and Damage" (Khan O. F., 2023) - ending a decades-long dispute over the financing of loss and damage in developing and least developed countries caused by continuous environmental change. Since its inception, the UNFCCC has been divided into developed and developing countries. Because developed countries have contributed unprecedented amounts of carbon to the atmosphere, developing countries have long sought funding from wealthy countries for mitigation and adaptation measures to overcome their carbon footprint. Pakistan and India are both vulnerable to climate change and need financial support to combat it. According to one analysis, climate-related losses and damages will cost South Asia \$518 billion by 2050 and may lead to unsustainable situations in Pakistan

and India due to their economic and population growth (Kumari, 2022). After recent natural disasters, Pakistan has lost over \$4 billion due to repeated environmental changes, with floods and droughts being the most common natural disasters (Klein, 2015). The scenario was similar on the other side of the border. The 2019 floods in India cost more than \$10 billion (Kumari, 2022). During the 77th session of the United Nations, the Prime Minister of Pakistan stated that despite a carbon contribution of less than 1%, Pakistan is experiencing the most destructive effects of global warming (UN News, 2022). He called on underdeveloped countries to set up climate funds to cover losses and damage caused by environmental changes in the next decades. In response, the United Nations General Assembly issued a resolution calling for the establishment of climate funds to combat climate change. Given shared environmental concerns and climate change goals, Pakistan and India, along with vulnerable states, have the opportunity to lead a group that can reinforce the "loss and damage" argument at international forums.

Conclusion

Security concerns in international politics have evolved rapidly over the millennia. Even after a decade, the threats vary dramatically. Climate change is undoubtedly a greater threat than previous threats in the 21st century. Developed countries are currently fascinated by climate change and are making progress in dealing with non-traditional threats. Meanwhile, Pakistan and India occupy an exceptional position in the current arena of international politics, as both have been mired in sustained competition for 75 years and have spent huge sums on military spending. While highlighting the comparable environmental challenges of Pakistan and India, it is clear that both countries face similar environmental issues and have an opportunity to work together. The two hostile yet neighboring states have been in conflict in their bilateral relations since 1947. Looking at the current state of bilateral relations between Pakistan and India, common and shared environmental issues such as water shortages and droughts, cross-border smog, joint efforts to secure financial support

related to losses and damages, and locust plagues provide an opportunity for the two rival nations to cooperate by bring them to a table. Further, transboundary environmental challenges could not be a source of conflict, but a source of increased cooperation to improve the health and well-being of the region's residents. As climate change, population growth and aging infrastructure continue to strain the quantity and quality of resources, India and Pakistan could improve management coordination and information sharing to maximize the benefits of sustainable resource management techniques for the populations of both countries. The current scenario, on the other hand, is characterized by disjointed management, stressed water and air resources and conflicts over shared environmental management obligations.

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