IS PEACE JOURNALISM POSSIBLE? THREE FRAMEWORKS FOR ASSESSING STRUCTURE AND AGENCY IN NEWS MEDIA

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Abstract:

Amongst practitioners and scholars of journalism, a movement towards "Peace Journalism" is gaining momentum, and attracting controversy.[1] Its proponents see it as an expression of, and/or improvement upon, the best practices of actually-existing journalism, as well as a means of ameliorating conflicts and opening up new opportunities for their peaceful resolution (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005). Peace Journalists regard conventional international news coverage -- its typical emphasis on violence, conflict as a two-sided win/lose struggle, government and military sources, and "our" suffering versus "their" villainy -- as comprising War Journalism.

By contrast, the opponents of Peace Journalism (henceforth, PJ), raise a number of objections: PJ is an unwelcome departure from objectivity and towards a journalism of attachment; it mistakenly assumes powerful and linear media effects; it is a normative model, rooted in the discipline of peace research, that fails sufficiently to take into account the constraints imposed by the actual dynamics of news production (including professional values and organizational imperatives), and hence, may have little to offer journalists in practice (Hanitzsch 2004a; 2004b).

Introduction:

In this paper, I want to take up the last of these criticisms. I start from the assumption that PJ is, or would be, a Good Thing, and thus, I largely bypass debates about its desirability. I also take for granted that journalism does matter to the prospects for war and peace, even if not in a unilinear or deterministic way. Rather than address the debates about media ethics and effects that PJ has provoked, this paper addresses another aspect. I want to argue that to succeed, PJ must translate its normative concerns, rooted in the discipline of peace research, into a strategy based on a theoretically-informed analysis of the governing logics of news production. PJ supporters need to conduct a purposeful review of what media scholarship tells us about the determinants of news production. Such a review could help us to identify blockages and opportunities for the practice of PJ (and conversely, War Journalism). Do media organizations have sufficient autonomy vis-a-vis other institutions, or journalists vis-a-vis media organizations, to put PJ into practice? Or is structural reform a prerequisite for the successful implementation of PJ?

This paper does not attempt a full literature survey, particularly since other scholars are also engaging in that task from a PJ perspective (e.g. Spencer 2005). Here, I want briefly to review three conceptual frameworks which could help shed light on the scope for agency in existing media institutions -- Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model of the media, Shoemaker and Reese's hierarchical model of influences on media content, and Pierre Bourdieu's notion of journalism as a field. I conclude that a

precondition of PJ's success is structural reform in that field, raising the strategic issue of how to build coalitions for media change.

It is not that PJ proponents have altogether ignored the question of how to transform journalism's practices, in the context of news media structures. In a landmark text that admirably combines theory and practice, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: xix) enquire into how deeply embedded War Journalism is, in the political economy of media industries:

If there's to be a journalistic revolution, does it entail taking over the commanding heights of the media economy? Not necessarily. In one sense, both government and commercial media have their own interests in creating images of 'self' and 'other' -- to command allegiance, and to sell products and services, respectively. 'The two systems thus tend to exacerbate international tensions by dichotomizing, dramatizing, and demonizing "them" against "us".' [citing Tehranian 2002].

The authors argue that even though War Journalism "has powerful political and economic imperatives at its back," there is still scope for PJ, through the agency of journalists. In a chapter devoted to explaining "why is news the way it is," they give particular attention to Herman and Chomsky's (1988) "Propaganda Model". More generally, amongst civil society activists concerned with media change, especially in the US, the Propaganda Model is probably the best-known critical theory of the media. It thus makes a useful starting point for this review.

THE PROPAGANDA MODEL

Herman and Chomsky (1988: 2) regard the dominant American media as comprising a single propaganda system in which "money and power are able to filter out the news fit to print, marginalize dissent, and allow the government and dominant private interests to get their messages across to the public." In their extensive studies of American media treatment of human rights and US foreign policy during the period of the Cold War, the authors found example after example of politically-charged double standards (Hackett 1991: 35-36). Human rights abuses committed by pro-US regimes were ignored, minimized or excused, while those perpetrated by pro-Soviet or other enemy states were more likely to receive extensive and strongly negative treatment. The US press implicitly treated repressive US client states in Latin America and elsewhere as if they were autonomous allies of the US, whereas the responsibility for human rights violations in pro-Soviet regimes (in eastern Europe and elsewhere) was laid at the feet of the Soviet Union. People abused in enemy states were defined implicitly as "worthy victims," their suffering treated in detail and sympathetically, while those in US client states were portrayed as "unworthy victims" (Chomsky and Herman 1979: 12, 37-41). The term "terrorism" was typically applied to the "retail terror" of left-wing insurgent groups, and not to the "wholesale" official or clandestine violence of states -- except sometimes, those hostile to the US. Staged, coercive elections held in militarized US client states in Latin America were portrayed as legitimate expressions of the popular will, while an election held under conditions of greater real freedom by Nicaragua's left-wing regime in 1984, was framed as deficient and illegitimate (Herman and Chomsky 1988: 87-142; Hackett 1991: 36).

While Chomsky and Herman do not use the term, their findings correspond to the characteristics of War Journalism: double standards consonant with elite perspectives,

that portray "our" side as moral and righteous, and "them" as evil and aggressive. While the Soviet bloc has disintegrated and the Cold War ended, Chomsky and Herman continue to find similar media subservience to warlike elite perspectives in the wake of the 9/11 attacks and the "war on terror" (e.g. Chomsky 2001: 30).

Why do these patterns persist? The Propaganda "Model" is actually more than that -- it is not just an heuristic device for organizing data, but an actual theory, a set of related propositions about the media's governing logics, intended to "help explain the nature of media coverage of important political topics" (Herman 1996: 116). In its original version, Herman and Chomsky (1988: 3-31) identified five institutionalized pressures or "filters" that bind the media to elite interests: first, the corporate and commercial of media, including the wealth, size and concentrated nature of media ownership; second, media dependence on corporate advertising revenue; third, media reliance on information from government, business and associated "expert" sources; fourth, right-wing "flak" in the form of sustained criticism and pressure from conservative media monitoring and policy institutes; and fifth, the ideological environment of anti-communism as a "national religion". In the post-Cold War era, Herman (1996: 125) has supplemented anti-Communism with free market fundamentalism as an ideological filters. (In a later modification of the Propaganda Model, Herman dispenses with the ideological filter altogether, perhaps because it too directly implies a critique of popular consciousness that is difficult to reconcile with a populist stance.   Conversely, he divides the information/source filter into two components: news shapers (experts, disproportionately conservative); and news makers -- politicians and institutions capable of generating what Boorstin (1980 [1961]) christened "pseudo-events", such as press conferences, created for the purpose of being reported and to serve a political agenda (Media Education Foundation 1997).

The Propaganda Model emphasizes the major media's structured subordination to (or imbrication with) the interests of political and economic elites. A similar analysis, concerned more specifically with media's role in representing and reproducing violence and peace, was earlier offered by Becker (1982). If Chomsky and Herman empirically critiqued American mass media, Becker theoretically critiqued transnational (but western-dominated) media (Hackett 1991: 36).   Drawing inspiration from the then-current New World Information and Communication Order movement, which called *inter alia* for more equal information flows between the global North and South, Becker attacked the liberal notion that the extension of transnational information flows necessarily promotes peace. Deriding the typical research focus on the effects of media (representations of) violence on their audiences, Becker reframes the issue: media are part of a system of structural violence, which Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: 59-60; emphasis in original) define as "a structure, usually understood as a *system* of political, social or economic relations, [that] creates barriers that people cannot remove...an *invisible form* of violence, *built into* ways of doing and ways of thinking," a form that "includes economic exploitation, political repression and cultural alienation".   For Becker, media are embedded in, and help to reproduce, relations of inequality within and between nations. Accordingly:

If mass-media reception as well as production are at once expression and motor of structural violence; if communications technology can be understood, historically, only as

an integral part of the emerging military industrial complex; if the access to and the power over the mass media are unequal and unbalanced...then the mass media can fulfill their original hoped for function as "peace-bringers" [only] under rare and exceptional circumstances. The representation of violence in the mass media, then, is part and parcel of the universal violence of the media themselves (Becker 1982: 227).

Such structural critiques, particularly the Propaganda Model, have important advantages for PJ educators and practitioners. The model's moral and empirical clarity has helped it gain a hearing amongst youth and social movements, probably more so than any other critical or left-wing perspective on media, at least in North America. It is an antidote to naive liberal notions of the free press, and still more so to the conservative concept of the "left-liberal media", heavily promoted in the US. It calls attention to the inherent articulation of media with power, and identifies specific structural links which can help explain the persistence of War Journalism. In testing its explanatory capacity, Chomsky and Herman have used a "paired example" approach (e.g. "worthy" versus "unworthy" victims) which can readily be adopted as criteria for monitoring and evaluating conflict coverage.

Nevertheless, the model has significant limitations, particularly when it is misconstrued as a complete explanation of the news agenda, contrary to its authors' stated intentions (Herman 1996: 118; see also Herman 2000). To be sure, there are some "silly" criticisms (such as the claim that it is a "conspiracy theory") that can readily be dismissed. But over the years, more serious criticisms have emerged:

It tends towards *reductionism*, oversimplifying the complexity of the news system, treating it as an epiphenomenon of other institutions (state and capital). In particular, it has little to say about journalists, or the ways in which they may exercise agency within newsrooms; instead, Chomsky has sometimes argued, the news is a predictable product of institutional priorities, much like cars on an assembly line (Media Education Foundation 1997). Similarly, it has little to say about how audiences interpret the news. Although Herman (1996: 118) stresses that it is a model of media performance and behaviour, not effects, the very phrase "manufacturing consent" implies that audiences accept elite frameworks relatively passively. (Yet at the same time, it has been argued, the model seems to imply a naive faith in the possibility of unrestrained "free" communication, and in the rationality and ideological independence of audiences-as-citizens, once the shackles of media-induced false consciousness are removed (Hackett 1991: 39)).

Similarly, the model has been criticized as *functionalist*, emphasizing the smooth reproduction of the system, scanting contradictions and tensions within it, and thus failing adequately to explore the openings for oppositional interventions within and against the propaganda system. When taken as a complete analysis, such functionalism can be disempowering to peace movements and other agents of social change. It also does little to identify the scope and conditions under which newsworkers could exercise the kind of choices called for by PJ.

To be sure, Herman (1996: 124) points to certain conditions which permit the expression of dissent within the dominant media, notably division within elites, and mobilization by oppositional groups. But other contradictions are relatively overlooked,

such as the tension between media corporations' need to attract audience trust, and their reliance upon official sources whose credibility may be in question in some contexts (such as the non-discovery of Iraq's weapons of mass destruction). In the context of the British government's support for the invasion of Iraq, Lynch and McGoldrick (2005: 199-200) argue that neither British business in general, nor media corporations specifically, had a vested interest in promoting the war. To the contrary, the war brought "depressed stock market performance," meagre pickings in reconstruction contracts, and mushrooming public deficits to industry; and an advertising recession, declining newspaper sales, and "plummeting ad revenues" to the media. Yet the patterns of War Journalism persisted, for reasons (notably, the objectivity ethos) not well addressed in the Propaganda Model.

In short, and particularly in some of its more doctrinaire interpretations, the Propaganda Model risks:

>...reducing the news media to tired ideological machines confined to performing endlessly, and unfailingly, the overarching function of reproducing the prerogatives of an economic and political elite through processes of mystification. Journalists would then become little more than well-intentioned puppets whose strings are being pulled by forces they cannot fully understand (Allan 2004a: 55).

THE HIERARCHY OF INFLUENCES MODEL

Compared to the Propaganda Model, the "Hierarchy of Influences" model calls attention to a broader range of pressures on news content (Shoemaker and Reese 1996). This model is hierarchical in that the five layers of influences identified range successively from the micro level to the macro. The authors use this model to organize the substantial literature on media determinants.

As I have summarized elsewhere (Hackett and Uzelman 2003), the first level comprises media workers themselves. Their professionally-related roles and ethics appear to have a direct influence on content, whereas their socio-demographic backgrounds and their personal and political beliefs shape news indirectly, especially when individuals are in a position to override institutional pressures or organizational routines (Shoemaker and Reese 1996: 65). The second layer of influence consists of daily work routines within the newsroom, routines that structure journalists' output independently of their personal backgrounds and values. Converting raw materials (information) garnered from suppliers (sources) and delivering it to customers (audiences and advertisers) results in standardized and recurring patterns of content (p. 109). The third layer of influence references the broader organizational imperatives of media institutions. Here, the profit orientation shared by private media companies, combined with their hierarchical structure, in general shape content in accordance with ownership's interests.   The fourth layer comprises extra-media influences, including sources, advertisers, the political power of governments, market structures, and technology. Finally, and most broadly, is the influence of ideology -- a system of values and beliefs that governs what audiences, journalists and other players in the news system see as 'natural' or 'obvious' and that furthermore serves in part to maintain prevailing relations of power (pp. 221-24). Ideology not only shapes news, it is extended, renewed and reproduced through media content.

This model is an heuristic device, not a theory *per se*. It should be evaluated on the basis of its utility in raising questions and organizing research data, rather than its explanatory power as such. I have found it useful in organizing the media sociology literature with a view to identifying the extent of corporate influence, and the offsetting "progressive" and "conservatizing" forces operating at different levels of the press system (Hackett and Uzelman 2003; Hackett and Carroll 2006: Chapter 2). It should be possible to do likewise with respect to the forces which reinforce War Journalism, and the openings for the practice of PJ. The following is offered speculatively, as a basis for further research.

At the microlevel of journalists' influence on news production, at least in the North American context, some of the personal values of journalists (social liberalism, respect for human rights, "post-materialist" attitudes (Miljan and Cooper 2003: 59)) may incline them towards suspicion of militarism, sympathy for moderate dissenters, and/or personal voting support for liberal politicians or parties (Lichter, Lichter and Rothman 1986). Aspects of their social background would lead in the same direction; journalists tend to be more secular, urban and educated compared to the national population (e.g. Miljan and Cooper 2003: 68-72).

On the other hand, most journalists are citizens of particular states and members of national cultures, and they are not immune to the biases of nationalism in covering international conflict, particularly when their news organizations and audiences are also nationally based. Moreover, journalistic professionalism privileges the ethos of objectivity, albeit more strongly in some countries and news organizations than others; as we argue below, it is an ethos that correlates all too readily with key characteristics of War Journalism.

At the second and third levels of influences on the news, daily news routines and organizational imperatives may provide some scope for diversity and for contextual news broader than that typical of War Journalism. The convention of covering "both sides" of legitimate controversies (Hallin 1986: 116-17) provides openings for anti-war voices, in historical situations (such as the later years of the Vietnam war) when a war policy has produced dissension amongst elites, and when dissent is not equated with deviance. (On the other hand, the same convention of "two sides" to a controversy reduces its complexity and the diversity of viewpoints, at odds with the PJ proposal to identify multiple stakeholders in conflicts.) The sociologist Herbert Gans (1980) identified a number of factors that news producers take into account in framing the news, including "audience considerations"; some of these, such as the audience-building potential of "human interest" stories about peacemaking and reconciliation, are consistent with PJ. The fact that some media, like BBC World or CNN International, are aimed at audiences in different countries, as well as the stake these organizations have in their reputation for independence and trustworthiness, could help to temper tendencies towards national chauvinism in conflict reporting.

On the other side of the ledger, many organizational routines and imperatives lend themselves all too easily to War Journalism. In selecting and framing news, journalists employ professional "news values" that, in part, link news judgement to audience considerations. In an update of pioneering peace/media research by Johan Galtung and Mari Ruge (1965), Harcup and O'Neill (2001) suggest ten such criteria: the power elite

(reference to powerful people or organizations); celebrity; entertainment (including drama and human interest); surprise; bad news; good news (e.g. rescues and cures); magnitude; relevance to the audience; follow-up; and the news organization's own agenda. Roughly speaking, one can infer from this list that war and governments are typically more newsworthy than peace processes and activists. In addition to audience considerations, the pressures of meeting deadlines encourage newsmakers to stick to simple storylines and familiar stereotypes, and to favour immediate events (like battles) over long-term processes (like peacebuilding) -- all key features of War Journalism.

Such pressures undoubtedly reinforce "rhetorical and narrative structures" that "shape and constrain the way in which newspapers report conflict" (Fawcett 2002: 213). Even when they were editorially committed to a "win-win" compromise, two newspapers on opposite sides of the Northern Ireland conflict failed to escape the conflict-exacerbating frames of their respective political communities in their actual reporting -- until a particularly tragic (and newsworthy) event, and a consequent shift in elite opinion, altered the narrative (ibid.).

At the fourth level, of extra-media institutions and processes, the factors identified by Shoemaker and Reese also cut in both directions. Consider audiences as an influence on news frames. Depending perhaps on the political context, audiences may sometimes reject wartime news (Lynch and McGoldrick 2005: 200); but they also enjoy drama and ethnocentric, manichean narratives. They may also share a patriotic and/or morbid fascination with the spectacle of violence and the display of military prowess, particularly on television.

When translated into the terms of the Shoemaker/Reese model, many of the "filters" identified in the Propaganda Model (state/government financial and legal influence, conservative "flak," elite experts, government information control, etc.) can be considered "extra-media" influences. Many of these do on balance tend to favour War Journalism. However, we should not automatically assume that these influences always work against conflict resolution; elites may sometimes initiate and promote peace processes.

Technology is another cross-cutting influence. The influence of the Internet on the practices and agendas of journalism, and of communication in conflict situations, is a topic too vast for exploration here; suffice to note that it has facilitated the expansion of voices, and new forms of online journalism -- including the weblogs of Iraqi civilians as witnesses to the 2003 invasion -- that are often consistent with PJ (Allan 2004a: 188-90; Allan 2004b). On the other hand, some writers regard the still-powerful media of television (and film) as technologically biased in favour of the aestheticization of war (Mander 1978; Nelson 1987).

As an especially important extra-media influence, the pressures of commercialism on the globally dominant western media deserve particular consideration. As noted above, many advertisers and media organizations have a structural interest in directing societal resources to consumer spending rather than military production; on the other hand, some advertisers and media conglomerates (like the General Electric-owned NBC network) are significantly involved in the latter. More significant, advertising subtly but decidedly contributes to the corporate media's "democratic deficit," partly by

disproportionately serving, informing and empowering affluent urban consumers, who are the prime target markets for advertisers, at the relative expense of the rural and the poor (Hackett and Carroll 2006, chap. 1). In a country like India, such a disparity can have devastating consequences for the (lack of) access to the dominant public sphere on the part of the poor and their issues, including the social roots and consequences of drought and famine (Thomas 2005).

Moreover, advertising-based media are structurally linked to the "ceaseless promotion of consumerism," with its destructive consequences for the physical and cultural environment (Hackett and Carroll 2006: 8). As American environmentalist Bill McKibben (1999: 45-6) has put it,

The thing to fear from television is less the sight of [people] mowing each other down with machine guns than the sight of people having to have every desire that enters their mind gratified immediately...[T]hat kind of culture is going to be a violent one, no matter what images one shows. Television hasn't done this by itself,...but it's the anchor and central ideol of this system of values that dominates us.

The broadest layer of influence, ideology and cultural narratives, also cuts in both directions. For instance, Canada's myth of peacekeeping, or concepts of democracy and human rights embedded in the culture, are resources for peace advocates. But conversely, dominant cultural narratives can emphasize national self-glorification, hostility to particular Others, and the connection of national self-esteem and self-defence to military power, as in America's "master narrative" of war (Hackett and Zhao 1994).

Like the Propaganda Model, the Hierarchy of Influences framework was developed in the American national context. Any contemporary analysis of journalism and conflict must now also take into account the context of cultural and economic globalization (growing interdependence and the near-universalization of capitalist social relations) as well as more specifically, media globalization, by which I mean not only the emergence of transnational media organizations, but also "the articulation of nationally based media systems with global markets and processes" (Zhao and Hackett 2005: 1). Like other influences identified by Shoemaker and Reese, globalization has contradictory implications for the prospects for PJ. Economic "globalization from above" has created growing economic interdependence (Friedman 2000) and arguably a capitalist class which is increasingly integrated across national boundaries (Sklair 2001). As broad contexts for the media, these features can be read positively: they raise the economic costs and political barriers for regimes contemplating war as an option (Friedman 2000), and thus may act as brakes upon war-mongering within nationally-based media.

But capitalist globalization can also be read negatively: it arguably intensifies the structural violence of marginalization, inequality, exploitation and ecological degradation, compounded by the media's "global fishbowl" effect (Tehranian 2002: 59), whereby the world's poor majority is increasingly aware of the North's (media-exaggerated?) affluence. Whether "globalization from below," the mobilization of an emergent global civil society, is sufficient to challenge the dark side of capitalist globalization from above, remains to be seen; at the very least, it may create a social basis for PJ, as global justice struggles challenge and transform dominant news narratives.

JOURNALISM AS A FIELD:

The Hierarchy of Influences model is useful to researchers seeking to identify specific influences on the news, and to explore relationships between them. Compared to the Propaganda Model, it calls attention to a broader range of factors, and to their often contradictory nature. If the Propaganda Model overemphasizes structural determination, however, the Hierarchy model may overplay the multiplicity and contingency of influences; and both models risk obscuring the specificity and coherence of journalism as a cultural practice and form of knowledge-production.

Not just those two models, but much of the anglo-American literature on media determinants and media power, is informed by empiricist notions of linear causality; where scholars differ concerns the direction in which the causal arrow runs -- from economic and political power to the media, or vice versa. A somewhat different way of conceptualizing journalism's political functioning can be obtained by selectively drawing from French social theory about social structure. The work of Michel Foucault and Pierre Bourdieu implies an analysis of media as a relatively autonomous institutional sphere, one which articulates with relations of power, knowledge and production more broadly, but which also has a certain logic of its own. Foucault spoke of "discursive regimes" - of how power is imbricated with knowledge, not by directly imposing censorship or coercion from outside, but indirectly and internally, through the criteria and practices that "govern" the production of statements (Foucault 1984: 54-5; Hackett and Zhao 1998: 6). Thus, power relations may be manifested or even constituted, within the everyday routines and ethos of workaday journalism -- a conception which implies the productivity and power of journalism, and the potential agency of journalists as social actors, without seeing it as entirely free-floating or self-determining.

Bourdieu's concept of "field" may be more useful still, since it pays more fulsome attention to the potentially asymmetrical relationship *between* as well as within institutional spheres. In his view:

...any social formation is structured by way of a hierarchically organized series of fields (the economic field, the educational field, the political field, the cultural field, etc.), each defined as a structured space with its own laws of functioning and its own relations of force independent of those of politics and the economy...Each field is relatively autonomous but structurally homologous with the others. Its structure, at any given moment, is determined by the relations between the positions agents occupy in the field (Johnson, in Bourdieu 1993: 6).

Each field is "a social universe with its own laws of functioning" (ibid., p. 14), a "microcosm with its own laws, defined both by its position in the world at large and by the attractions and repulsions to which it is subject from other such microcosms" (Bourdieu 1998: 39). Typically, each field is characterized by its own ethos, its own formal and informal rules and logics, its own set of status and power positions for individual agents (such as journalists) to occupy, its own forms of interests or resources -- capital -- for which agents compete. In the economic sphere, agents presumably compete for economic capital through investment strategies; in the political sphere, they compete for governmental power. If we regard cultural production in general, and mass media or journalism specifically, as distinct fields, two forms of capital are particularly relevant:

symbolic capital, the accumulation of prestige or celebrity; and cultural capital, forms of cultural knowledge or dispositions (Johnson 1993: 7). Indeed, this insight suggests that journalism and related forms of large-scale cultural production (the "media"), have the distinct feature of combining economic power (the production of profit) and symbolic power, which is ultimately the capacity to define social reality. The "media" are influential in so far as they comprise a concentration of society's symbolic power (Couldry 2003: 39), with a consequent "reality effect" (Bourdieu 1998: 21-22). That is, media generate categorizations of the world that acquire a reality of their own and influence the course of social struggles and the perceptions of peace movements, other social movements, and broader publics.

Put differently, Bourdieu suggests that the journalistic field is considerably influenced by commercial or economic constraints, particularly as embodied in the audience ratings system, but in turn (especially due to the mass reach of television as a medium), journalism imposes structural constraints upon other fields (notably on politics, and on other spheres of cultural production) (Marliere 1998: 220; Bourdieu 1998: 56).

Thus, this approach invites us to consider journalism and mass media as relatively autonomous fields within a broader field of power, which itself is structured in dominance: some fields may well be more dominant, or may exert a greater gravitational force, over the whole social formation. This metaphor takes us beyond linear, billiard-ball causality, to suggest a new way of conceptualizing how journalism interacts with economic forces, the political system, science, or other institutional spheres, and also with capitalism, patriarchy, racism, militarism, or other axes of domination. While recognizing, indeed insisting, that individuals are active and creative agents pursuing strategies with the resources available to them, this model turns our attention to structured roles and relationships -- including interactions between institutional fields. Thus:

External determinants can have an effect only through transformations in the structure of the field itself. In other words, the field's structure *refracts*, much like a prism, external determinants in terms of its own logic, and it is only through such refraction that external factors can have an effect on the field. The degree of autonomy of a particular field is measured precisely by its ability to refract external demands into its own logic (Johnson 1993: 14; emphasis in original).

This very rich passage suggests that the most important form of external influence upon journalism is not explicit and occasional interventions (like an advertiser trying to kill a story, or a source pressing for favourable spin), but rather the long-term re-structuring of the ground rules and routines which shape (relatively autonomous) journalism on a workaday basis.

What does this conceptual framework look like "on the ground," when it is applied to actual journalism practices? And how is it relevant to Peace Journalism? In his controversial critique of television journalism, written for a French readership in the 1990s (Bourdieu 1998), Bourdieu himself was not centrally concerned with war and peace, but with the impact of the journalism field on democracy and on the quality of cultural production. However, his analysis clearly has implications for peace discourse in and through the news.

For Bourdieu, TV journalism has developed a number of destructive characteristics. It privileges entertainment over real information, confrontations over reasoned arguments, political tactics over substance, individuals, anecdotes and scandals over the analysis of structures or processes. TV news has created a new category of journalist/intellectuals, fast-food thinkers who promote cynicism and simplification (ibid: 3, 29). Worse, it stimulates xenophobic fears, excessive concerns about crime and safety, and the "primal passions" of nationalism (ibid: 11), and it overaccesses ethnocentric and racist demagogues (ibid: 8). In offering fragmented, decontextualized images of events, and in portraying politics as a game for professionals, TV disempowers audiences as citizens, giving them nothing to stimulate cohesive or oppositional interpretations. TV breaks the ties between politicians and publics (ibid: 5), undermining intermediary institutions like unions and parties which have a mandate as guardians of collective values, to elaborate "considered solutions to social questions" (ibid: 77). All these factors bear ominously against the kind of discourse that PJ asks news media to generate. At their root, Bourdieu points to the subordination of journalism to market logic through the mechanism of audience ratings, although he acknowledges other factors, such as journalists' training and their long-standing tradition of competing for "scoops" and exclusives.

There is much to criticize in the specifics of Bourdieu's particular analysis. In the US, the country where "hyper-commercialism" has arguably taken its greatest toll on the quality of journalism (McChesney 2004), his observations may well seem commonplace. More important, his normative standpoint seems less concerned with peaceful humane governance (though he repeatedly stresses his commitment to democracy) than with insulating other fields of cultural production (juridical, literary, art, science) from degradation by market-driven journalism. Though he disavows "nostalgia" for paternalistic television (Bourdieu 1998: 48), there is arguably an element of cultural elitism in the analysis.

Nevertheless, his framework is very rich, and can be applied to news characteristics more directly relevant to PJ. Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) see journalism's ethos of objectivity as a primary mainstay of War Journalism, particularly the dualistic presentation of conflict (Us versus Them), dependence on official sources, and the preference for events (e.g. battles) over processes (e.g. the build-up to, or resolution of, conflicts). It may thus be useful to consider the analysis by Hackett and Zhao (1998) of the "regime of objectivity" that has characterized North American journalism for most of the twentieth century. While they do not explicitly use Bourdieu's framework, their analysis illustrates his emphasis on the relative autonomy of the journalism field, and the way its relatonship with other fields is refracted through its own governing logics.

By "regime of objectivity," Hackett and Zhao (ibid: 86) mean an interrelated complex of ideas and practices that provide "a general model for conceiving, defining, arranging, and evaluating news texts, news practices, and news institutions". The regime comprises five dimensions. Objectivity is a normative ideal, a set of desiderata (factualness, accuracy, completeness, as well as a stance of detachment, neutrality or independence). Second, it entails an epistemology, assumptions about knowledge and reality, like the possibility of separating values from facts and observers from observed.

Third, objectivity also crucially involves newsgathering and presentation practices, like the use of appropriate sources and the separation of news from opinion in the pages of the daily paper. Fourth, the objectivity regime is institutionalized in social structures, a framework which journalism has actively helped to construct, not merely reflect, and comprises "complex, specialized news organizations, with compartmentalized roles and departments (the marketing and advertising departments over there, the newsroom pristinely overe here), staffed by professionals with appropriate skills and ethical commitments, and enjoying autonomy from the state..." (ibid: 86). And finally, as an active ingredient in public discourse, objectivity and related concepts, like bias, fairness and balance, provide the language for everyday talk about news.

While journalism's regime of objectivity is no mere expression of external forces, however, neither is it free-floating. It has social, political, historical conditions of existence. One might say that journalism's objectivity regime, and the institutional environment of other fields, mutually constituted. The invention of the telegraph and the related emergence of wire services encouraged a shift from partisan commentary to non-partisan facticity in the nineteenth-century press. So too did the economic interest of reaching large, multi-partisan readerships, on the part of the emerging commercial daily press. The state has used the objectivity/balance ethos in regulating broadcasting and in guiding its relationships to media outlets; compared to media seen as "mainstream" or "objective," those defined as "alternative" or advocacy media are more vulnerable to legal harassment or informal discrimination (such as exclusion from high-level political meetings, or wartime reporter "pools"). Other factors that have shaped and solidified the objectivity regime included the rising status of science and empirical research in the nineteenth century, the increasing educational level and professional-status claims of journalists, and the political legitimation needs of monopoly newspaper owners in the twentieth century (ibid: 36-81).

Historically, the characteristics of the objectivity regime have not been fixed in stone. Both journalism, and its articulation with other institutional fields, have evolved over time. Thus, while the notion of objectivity as truth-telling in the public interest has been a remarkably persistent touchstone of North American journalism, both its practices and conceptualization have shifted. The "naive realism" of late-nineteenth century faith in the ability of facts to speak for themselves gave way after World War I to a narrower definition of objectivity as "a method designed for a world in which even facts could not be trusted" (Schudson 1978: 122). The carnage of war, the apparent success of wartime propaganda, Freudian psychology, the rise of totalitarian regimes, and the Great Depression all undermined the culture's confidence in the reliability of facts, the rationality of citizens, and the permanence of democratic capitalism (Hackett and Zhao 1998: 40). The same historical moment of confusion and complexity also gave rise to interpretive reporting, intended to provide context and perspective without undermining objectivity. Later, the upheavals in 1960s popular culture, and the "credibility gap" between American government and public resulting from the Vietnam war and the Watergate scandal, paved the way for a more critical mode of journalism, albeit one more prone to adversarial style than to counterhegemonic substance.

So, an interacting set of fields have generated journalism's regime of objectivity, and in turn, the routine practices of journalism objectivity have political or ideological

consequences -- largely unintended, but in a generally conservative direction. Consider one of the hallmarks of "objective" reporting -- the use of "appropriate sources" to provide credible, relevant and authoritative "facts". It just so happens that the sources who are most "appropriate" -- available, articulate, convenient and appparently authoritative -- as frequently representatives of powerful institutions (ibid: 142). While it may provide openings for change and the expression of opposition, journalism's objectivity regime on the whole:

     ...provides a legitimation for established ideological optics and power relations. It systematically produces partial representations of the world, skewed towards dominant institutions and values, whie at the same time it disguises that ideological role from its audiences. It thereby wins consent for 'preferred readings'...embedded in the news. In contemporary North American society, these preferred readigs ratify and reproduce the ideological framework of liberal-democratic capitalism. More specifically, over the last two decades or so, objective journalism has been complicit in naturalizing a move towards a right-wing market-liberalism (Hackett and Zhao 1998: 161).

     Such "conservatizing" consequences of objectivity are not necessarily intended, but, given the position of journalism within a structured field of power, neither are they purely accidental. Journalism (and media) may be a relatively autonomous field, but it is not a level one on which to play. The insistent attention to the (re)production and contestation of hierarchies, and to the structural embeddedness of inequality, differentiates this position from the liberal-pluralism arguably implicit in the Hierarchies of Influence model.

     Moreover, as the three conceptual frameworks we have reviewed above suggest, if indeed journalism can be considered a field, it is a relatively "weak" one, in two related senses. First, its boundaries are permeable, its autonomy limited. Compared to fields like "high" culture (art, literature, poetry), science and technology, or (though now in retreat) academia, the logics and resources of journalism/mass media are less self-determining.

Second, while journalism/mass media is a field vastly more influential than high culture and academia, and while its concentration of symbolic power can constrain other fields, it does not perch atop the social formation. Arguably, in the era of market liberal hegemony and state- and corporate-driven globalization, all fields have become more subject to direct determination by the economic, and more specifically the untrammelled logic of capital accumulation. But journalism/mass media are especially vulnerable, because they are so heavily integrated into processes of generating political and economic capital. (Speculatively, in an era of corporate and political "branding" (Klein 2000), the very distinctions between symbolic, economic and political capital are themselves eroding.)

     Journalism's weakness as a distinct field is evident in the significant erosion of the regime of objectivity, the emblem of autonomy and professionalism, during the past two decades. The Reagan government's abandonment of the Fairness Doctrine, one which had mandated broadcasters to provide opportunity for counterbalancing commentary on controversial issues, narrowed the range of views and paved the way for partisan (mostly right-wing) networks, notably Fox. The 1996 Telecommunications Act enabled massive

growth in media concentration, and further encouraged the ethos of broadcasting as a property right rather than a public service. In 2001, the 9/11 terror attacks led US journalism to a largescale disavowal of "objectivity" as even an appropriate stance to take in reporting the Bush administration's "war on terror" (Navasky 2002). Shifts in the economic field (such as the rise of conglomerates driven by shareholders seeking short-term profits) have contributed to the prevalence of "infotainment" over public affairs programming. The depoliticization of the culture, and the concomitant decline of party identification amongst media audiences, has undermined the economic necessity for careful nonpartisanship amongst commercial media organizations.

The erosion of objectivity finds its pinnacle in Rupert Murdoch's Fox News Channel. This development can hardly give comfort to Peace Journalists. The fusion of news and commentary, the close political ties of its decision-makers with the Republican Party, the daily memos to set editorial agendas on blatantly political grounds, the political screening of its pundits, the musical and graphical tributes to American nationalism during news programs, are all clear violations of even the cautious, conservatizing versions of objectivity that had marked US journalism in earlier decades. Fox's only vestiges of objectivity are window-dressing: point-counterpoint talks shows setting right-wing pitbulls against *faux* liberal poodles (notably the talk-show *Hannity and Colmes*), and the network's marketing slogan "fair and balanced" (Franken 2003). The respected correspondent and author Philip Knightley (2002: 171) notes that Fox:

...has significantly increased its ratings by its all-out support for the war, encouraging its correspondents and presenters to express anger and a thirst for revenge, and to present the conflict as a biblical battle of good versus evil.

What is most revealing is not only that Fox has encountered little organized opposition within the ranks of journalism, but that its jingoistic and ultra-nationalist style and stance may be influencing other networks. To the extent that such is the case, Knightly concludes that "Dark days lie ahead."

CONCLUSION

The three models of news determinants discussed in this paper have rather different emphases. The Propaganda Model highlights several repressive "filters" that allegedly subordinate the news media to elite interests. The Hierarchy model identifies a broader range of influences in a more open-ended way. The Journalistic Field model moves away from linear causality to emphasize the relative autonomy and coherence of journalism as an institutitionalized sphere, functioning in relationship with other homologously structured fields.

All three models, however, have limitations which much be acknowledged, and taken as a challenge for further research. All three were developed in the context of powerful western nation-states (respectively, the US and France). Each of them assumes that journalism operates within entrenched institutional settings, with well-established and relatively stable relationships with mass audiences, and with economic and political institutions. Needless to say, these conditions do not obtain throughout the planet, and

the three models may have less to offer as a "map" for Peace Journalism in countries struggling to emerge from a neo-colonial and/or authoritarian past.

In addition to the models' own national biases, the global medias cape is changing in ways that these models cannot fully handle, premised as they are on relatively stable national media systems.   Oppositional and grassroots Internet-based outlets are challenging the dominance of mass media, introducing new voices and expanding the definition of journalism.   On the other hand, the dominant media corporations are extending their influence transnationally, through a multi-faceted process of media globalization, marked by the emergence of transnational media firms and markets; the spread of commercialized media as the general organizational form; the continued dominance of transnational media flows by western-based TNCs, with some reverse flow from regional production centres in the global South; emerging neo-liberal regimes of global media governance; and more ambiguously, the globalization of media effects (Zhao and Hackett 2005: 6-8).   Particularly at the level of English-speaking urban elites, media globalization is transforming the terrain for Peace Journalism.   Interestingly, Reese (2001) has begun an effort to adapt the Hierarchy model to the analysis of global journalism.

Within the dominant western countries, social and economic changes are also shifting the nature of journalism, as it increasingly dissolves within profit-driven media and entertainment and information conglomerates; its economic basis threatened by audience fragmentation; its governing ethos shifting from public service and "objectivity" (however conservatively defined), to one of consumerism and commercialism.   The regime of objectivity is in decline, but no clear replacement has emerged.   The whole field of journalism may be fragmenting, its social bases eroding.   This presents opportunities for PJ - there are more niches in the system to practice and find a constituency for different and experimental forms of journalism.   But it is also a challenge -- it may be more difficult to locate, let alone transform, the "commanding heights" of the agenda-setting national and global media.

That said, the three models do suggest the range of tasks and challenges confronting PJ.   These cannot be reduced to a single variable or point of intervention. The barriers to PJ include the difficulties of constructing 'peace' as a compelling narrative, the national basis (and biases) of much of the world's news media and their audiences, the ideological and structural links between media corporations and states, and the embeddedness of dominant media and states in relations of inequality (as the NWICO movement had argued).   In western media, the regime of objectivity may be a particularly important impediment to PJ, as Lynch and McGoldrick (2005) suggest; but our analysis above suggests that journalism objectivity is itself a multi-faceted regime that is related to institutional structures and imperatives.

In light of these challenges, I conclude by briefly addressing two questions.   First, what kind of media system could best facilitate PJ?   Second, through what strategic routes might it be implemented?

Tehranian (2002: 80) rightly notes that media ethical codes for PJ are "necessary but not sufficient," since ethical codes without sanctions are largely "pious wishes"; rather, "the structure is the message".   While this formulation may be overly

deterministic, all three models point to the intrinsic relationship between media structure, and journalism practices and content. Tehranian identifies the need for more "structural pluralism in media ownership and control" as a precondition for more democratic checks and balances, and for more content pluralism, including the diversity of voices in conflict situations that is called for by PJ. Support for public and community media systems is also required, to help offset the biases of corporate and government media towards commercial and political propaganda respectively. Moreover, echoing the NWICO movement's concerns, Tehranian calls for a World Media Development Bank, to help reduce the inequalities of media production and access within and between nations of the global North and South.

To these structural changes, one could add the development of genuinely multinational and internationalist media, able to address and engage audiences in different countries with programming that challenges ethnocentric narratives and provides multiple perspectives on conflict. Finally, PJ would be strengthened by national and global regimes of media governance that reinforced popular communication rights -- not only freedom of expression, but also access to the means of public communication.

What about vectors or strategies for change? From Bourdieu's analysis of fields, we can extrapolate three broad approaches (Hackett and Carroll 2006: 52).

One broad strategy is to reform the journalism field from within. The Hierarchy and Field models both suggest some degree of agency for newsworkers. There is indeed a necessary role for dedicated journalists to take the lead; as teachers, practitioners, writers and advocates, Jake Lynch and Annabel McGoldrick are themselves exemplars. Unfortunately, it seems probable that in the Western corporate media, at least, journalists have neither sufficient incentives, nor autonomy vis-a-vis their employers, to transform the way news is done, without support from powerful external allies. It may be that PJ is most likely to take root in societies (Rwanda? Indonesia? the former Yugoslavia?) that have experienced the ravages of violent conflict, and where the media have played a blatant role in fuelling the destructive fires of enmity. Moreover, I speculate, much of the impetus (or constituency) for PJ is likely to derive from the victims of war, from activists committed to peacebuilding processes, and/or from social justice movements marginalized by current patterns of national or global communication.

A second approach is to build a new field, parallel to currently-existing journalism. This is the option of creating alternative media organizations, supported by civil society, insulated from corporate or state power, and capable of putting into practice the ethos of PJ. The current Canadian-based initiative to create an Independent World Television news network, and to offer "real news" about peace and development to an international viewership, is a very encouraging step in this direction.

Finally, a third approach entails intervening in adjacent fields (such as those of politics, or social movements) to change the environment of journalism, the gravitational pulls to which it is subject. One key aspect of journalism's environment are state policies regarding culture and communication. Here, there are encouraging signs. Citizens' movements have emerged in a number of countries, demanding democratic reform of state communication policies, to help bring about more accountable, diverse and better quality media (see e.g. McChesney 2004; Hackett and Carroll 2006). In recent years,

similar efforts have been directed towards democratizing global media governance, such as CRIS, the Campaign for Communication Rights in the Information Society (O Siochru 2005). More broadly, social justice movements struggling to project their voice in the public arena could help shift the environment of journalism. So too could mobilized audiences, demanding "real news" as a condition of their own empowerment. Or indeed, survival.

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NOTES

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[1]. I am assuming that most readers of this journal are already familiar with the basic concepts of Peace Journalism. Briefly, as outlined by Lynch and McGoldrick (2005), PJ draws upon the insights of Conflict Analysis to look beyond the overt violence which is the stuff of news (especially television) and calls attention to the context, of Attitudes, Behaviour and Contradictions, and the need to identify a range of stakeholders broader than the "two sides" engaged in violent confrontation. If War Journalism presents conflict as a tug-of-war between two parties in which one side's gain is the other's loss, PJ invites journalists to re-frame conflict as a cat's cradle of relationships between various stakeholders. It also calls on journalists to distinguish between stated demands, and underlying needs and objectives; to identify and attend to voices working for creative and non-violent solutions; to keep eyes open for ways of transforming and transcending the hardened lines of conflict. And it calls attention to expanding our understanding of conflict beyond the direct physical violence which is the focus of War Journalism, to include the structural and cultural violence that may underlie conflict situations (Hackett 2006a).